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The debate surrounding whether genuine moral dilemmas exist or is a longstanding
one. Proponents of the existence of genuine moral dilemmas like Ruth Barcan
Marcus and Bernard Williams have appealed to the moral residue argument as a
means of proving that moral dilemmas exist. Opponents like WaIter Sinnott-
Armstrong, Patricia Greenspan, and Terence McConnell, however, have denied its
efficacy on the basis that the moral residue argument begs the question on two counts:
Firstly, by assuming that rationally irresolvable conflicts of commitments exist, and
secondly, by assuming that agents who experience moral residue have necessarily
done something wrong.
I argue in this thesis that there is a way that the moral residue argument can be
salvaged and provide a more precise account of appropriate moral residue - an
account that simultaneously overcomes the objections. Specifically, I argue that the
moral residue argument, when interpreted in terms ofthe independent standard of
integrity, can provide an account of appropriate moral residue that can explain what
the agent has done wrong, and that is neither too strict nor overlooks the fact of the
agent's harsh self-assessment and moral residue.
In so doing I show how the specific accounts of appropriate moral residue
assumed in the objections are flawed and miss the force of the point about moral
residue. By examining two case studies - Williams Styron's Sophie 's Choice, and
Euripides' Jphigenia at Aulis - I show that it can be established independently that
both Sophie and Agamemnon do something wrong and would do something wrong no
matter how they acted in their respective situations. Through Lynn McFall's
conception of integrity I show that Sophie and Agamemnon would undermine their
integrity regardless ofwhich of their alternative they chose to act on. In so doing I
establish that their moral residue is appropriate and would be appropriate had they
acted on their other alternative.
By this means I demonstrate how - when interpreted in terms of the
independent standard of integrity - the moral residue argument can support the
existence of genuine moral dilemmas.
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"It is notable that insofar as it is features of our moral experience that draw us towards
ideas ofobjectivity of ethics, the experience of moral conflict is precisely one that
conveys most strongly such an idea. That there is nothing one decently, honourably,
or adequately can do seems a kind of truth as firmly independent of the will and
inclination as anything in morality. Indeed it is independent of the will and
inclination, but it does not follow that it is independent ofwhat one is, nor that these
impressions represent an order of things independent ofoneself."1
"In such cases2 we see a wrong action committed without any direct physical
compulsion and in full knowledge of its nature, by a person whose ethical character or
commitments would otherwise dispose him to reject the act. The constraint comes
from the presence of circumstances that prevent the adequate fulfilment of two ethical
claims. Tragedy ... treats them as real cases of wrongdoing that are of relevance for an
assessment ofthe agent's ethicallife.,,3
The above passages express the ideas that I am concerned with in this thesis.
The idea that there can be cases in an agent's life where she faces a rationally
irresolvable conflict of commitments and inevitable wrongdoing is central to my
discussions. The possibility that there are cases where (despite the agent's will and
inclination to act in accordance with her commitments) there is nothing she can do to
prevent wrongdoing, means that the conception that all moral conflicts can be
rationally resolved has less weight than we may want it to have. Ifit is true that there
are cases where an agent cannot but undermine a commitment or do something
wrong, even if she is deliberating as rationally as possible, then it means that being
good/doing the right thing is not solely a matter of rational self-control.
The reality ofmoral dilemmas is a matter of philosophical debate.4 On one
side ofthe debate are those who argue that moral dilemmas are real and that there are
cases where an agent faces a genuine dilemma between two or more conflicting
commitments. This side of the debate claims that the agent is thus ultimately
condemned to moral failure in that whatever she chooses she will have done
something wrong. On the other side of the debate are those who argue that moral
1 Williams, Moral Luck, 1981, page 75
2 Cases of what Nussbaum calls 'tragic conflict' - a notion I discuss in due course3 .
Nussbaum, 2001, page 25
4 I do not distinguish between dilemmas and moral dilemmas in this section - exactly what counts as a
moral dilemma will become clear at a later stage. '
dilemmas are only apparent as one of the agent's requirements will always override
the other and thus there is no inevitable moral failure: no dilemma.
The implications of the debate are that if genuine moral dilemmas exist, then
some of moral theory as it stands will need to be revised. An important view in moral
theory is that being good is a matter of the agent's rational control: that the agent
herself is responsible for her moral goodness. If genuine moral dilemmas exist,
however, then morality includes a degree of moralluck5 in the sense that not all moral
conflicts are rationally resolvable. The agent is thus not completely in control of
whether she is good or not, or whether she can act morally or not. If goodness
involves a degree of moral luck, then moral and ethical theory has to revise the
conception that all moral conflicts are rationally resolvable.
Certain contemporary moral theories - and opponents of the genuine moral
dilemma debate - assume that values can be ranked hierarchically. The implication is
that practical rationality and deliberation can thus bring order and coherence, and
ensure that the agent can find a way to act morally provided she deliberates correctly.
Affirming the reality ofmoral dilemmas, however, threatens the power ofmoral
deliberation and the possibilities for coherence in moral philosophy. If genuine moral
dilemmas exist, then the implications are that goodness is fragile6 and is not solely a
matter of the agent's rational control. The existence of genuine moral dilemmas also
suggests a hierarchical ranking of values is not always possible and thus that values
are plural?
In this thesis, I argue that the moral residue argument, interpreted in terms of
the independent standard of integrity, can support the existence of genuine moral
dilemmas. Briefly, the moral residue argument defends the claim that emotions of
self-assessment like remorse, guilt, and shame - when felt appropriately - are evidence
that genuine moral dilemmas exist. Ifit can be shown that the moral residue
argument has merit, then it follows that moral psychology has a role to play in ethical
theory. That is, the harsh self-judgment involved in emotions like shame, guilt, and
remorse, has a story to tell about moral decisions and the moral character of an agent.
~ By "moral luck" I mean that being good and doing the right thing is not up to the agent entirely, as it
1S partly dependent on the circwnstances that she finds herself in. In this way - whether she can act
morally and stay true to her commitments - is a matter of "luck" or "chance," depending on the
situation she is faced with.
~ A notion taken from Martha Nussbaum's book. The Fragility o.lGoodness.
I elaborate on this later.
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I start by giving an account of the debate between those who argue that
genuine moral dilemmas exist, and those who deny their existence. In so doing I
discuss what conditions genuine moral dilemmas would have to satisfy were they to
exist, thus drawing a contrast with apparent dilemmas. After I have given an account
of the conditions that genuine moral dilemmas would have to meet were they to exist,
I discuss the available candidate cases for genuine moral dilemmas.
After establishing what a genuine moral dilemma would be, I discuss what the
moral residue argument is. I refer to Bemard Williams and Ruth Barcan Marcus who
both defend the moral residue argument as an argument supporting the existence of
genuine moral dilemmas, and I discuss in detail how the moral residue argument
works. I also briefly consider the emotions involved in the moral residue argument.
consider how those emotions differ from each other, and affect the agent. Thereafter I
discuss two of the (arguably) most important objections levelled against proponents of
the moral residue argument. In so doing I consider the arguments against the
existence of genuine moral dilemmas and the efficacy of the moral residue argument
put forward by WaIter Sinnott-Armstrong, Terence McConnelI, and Patricia
Greenspan.
The moral residue argument, as it stands, cannot hold up against these two
objections, as the objections show the argument to be fundamentally flawed. It is my
claim, however, that the moral residue argument interpreted in terms of integrity,
provides a superior and more precise conception of the notion ofappropriate moral
residue, and can overcome the objections. I thus provide a detailed account of
integrity and the necessary and sufficient conditions thereof
My discussions involve a number of thought experiments and case studies. I
use both a classical and a literary example. In so doing I show that in cases where
there is evidence of the agent's moral residue, we can appeal to integrity and a revised
conception ofappropriate moral residue to discern whether the agent actually finds
herself in a situation that satisfies the sufficient conditions ofa genuine moral
dilemma. I thus use Williams Styron's Sophie's Choice and Euripides' Iphigenia at
Aulis as case studies to show how the moral residue argument - when interpreted in
terms of the independent standard of integrity - works to support the existence of
genuine moral dilemmas.
Literature - and tragedies in particular - are valuable to ethical questions and
the question of whether the moral residue argument can be used to support the
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existence ofmoral dilemmas or not. Literary and classical examples allow us to
immerse ourselves in the plight of characters like Sophie and Agamemnon. We can
experience their feelings of guilt, shame, and remorse, and judge whether the
situations in which they respectively find themselves are situations that necessitate
wrongdoing or not. As is clear in the extract I cited from Martha Nussbaum above,
tragedies in particular treat moral conflicts, as real cases of wrongdoing. Tragedies
can thus be used as a means of assessing an agent's ethical life and character.
By examining the case studies I investigate the idea that our commitments
cannot be limited and ranked in the way that opponents of genuine moral dilemmas
may want them to be or think that they are. Human experience does not seem to be
such that an agent committed to numerous things is either incoherent or able to order
her commitments in such a way as to avoid conflict and wrongdoing. Furthermore, it
does not seem implausible that an agent will commit herself to a range of principles in
her life, and the more wide that range ofcommitments is, the more likely she is to
experience a conflict of commitments.8
Given the possibility of genuine moral conflicts where the agent cannot
rationally resolve her commitments - and the implication that such a possibility has
for the debate surrounding the existence of genuine moral dilemmas - in what follows
I argue for a particular conception of the moral residue argument in support of the
existence of genuine moral dilemmas.
8 Williams, 1981, Page 73
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Chapter 1
What is a moral dilemma?
In this section, I argue that genuine moral dilemmas would have to satisfy the
necessary conditions of 1) conflict, 2) loss, and 3) a situation imposed on the agent by
the world in which she is condemned to moral failure in some way. Although these
conditions are closely linked -and so may better be described as "aspects" of genuine
moral dilemmas - I call them "conditions" for the sake ofargument, although they are
somewhat artificially separated. In what follows, I thus give an account of what
conditions moral dilemmas would have to satisfy were they to exist. At times it may
appear that I am assuming that genuine dilemmas exist. I, however, am only giving
an account of what they would be like if they did exist.
The first condition is that the agent must experience a genuine conflict of
commitments: a conflict that caIUlot be rationally resolved.9 This is because the
nature of the conflict must be such that the agent is conunitted to doing at least two
actions, but she cannot do both. By "committed" I mean that she is in some sense
required to do both actions. By that I mean that she feels the force of both alternatives
and is tom between them. The agent can thus only do one of the two actions as to opt
out would mean that she undermines both of her commitments. This would essentially
be worse for her since she will have failed on two counts as opposed to just one. I call
this the conflict condition.
In this thesis, I concentrate on personal conflicts specifically - although inter-
personal conflicts also come into the debate. An example ofa conflict of
commitments is if, for example, an agent makes a commitment to meet his wife at the
hospital while she is in labour with their first child. On the way to the hospital, he sees
an elderly woman who has been mugged and hurt. In such a case he has a conflict of
commitments (the commitment he made to his wife to be there with her during the
birth and his commitment to help those in need) and has to choose between the two.
For a conflict to be a genuine dilemma, it must be true that the conflict between the
agent's commitments cannot rationally be resolved.
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To say that a genuine moral dilemma is one where the conflict of
commitments cannot be rationally resolved, means that if an agent has a commitment
to do A and a commitment to do B, and her commitment to do each is equally
weighted so that both A and B are equally important for her to do (and she cannot do
both), then there is no rational way of resolving the tension between those two
commitments. The agent thus, when faced with a genuine dilemma, cannot just
deliberate to enable her to decide that A overrides B, or vice versa. This is because if
the agent can rationally resolve the conflict, then it follows that there is no genuine
conflict as one of her commitments will be seen to override the other - in which case
the dilemma would have been apparent, not genuine. Apparent dilemmas are unlike
genuine moral dilemmas in that they can be rationally resolved. This is because, if
the agent can rationally work out that A is a more important and pressing commitment
than B, then it necessarily follows that A overrides B and the conflict is eradicated.
Thus, if the dilemma is genuine, it must be true that the agent cannot deliberate to
alleviate the conflict. In this way, a genuine dilemma is the opposite of a conflict that
can be rationally resolved. One of the necessary conditions ofa genuine moral
dilemma therefore, is that it involves a difficult decision between conflicting
commitments: a decision that is not rationally soluble.
Expanding on the conflict condition and discussing the implications involved
in the type ofconflict required for a genuine moral dilemma to exist, brings me to the
second condition: the condition that if a genuine moral dilemma exists, then it has to
satisfY the condition of loss. This shows how the conflict condition is related to the
loss condition. Given that the agent cannot do both actions, whichever action she
chooses, it must be true to say that she has failed to live up to her own commitments.
By this, I mean that the agent has to undermine at least one of her commitments in
eventually choosing how to act. It follows that in a situation where the agent faces a
genuine moral dilemma, she will inevitably end up doing something wrong and may
also end up losing some of her integrity 10 by not being able to act on both, or all, of
her commitments.
For it to be a genuine moral dilemma, the agent would thus have to
compromise her commitments and experience loss. That the agent will- in cases of
9 A concept I discuss in more detail in due course.
10 By "integrity" I loosely mean being true to your central commitments - although I discuss the
concept of integrity in more detail.
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genuine moral conflict (and thus, genuine moral dilemma) - inevitably end up doing
something wrong or contrary to her commitments11, means that the second condition
for the existence of genuine moral dilemmas is that they involve loss. This loss
manifests itself in the form ofnegative emotions ofself-assessment l2 1ike shame,
guilt, and remorse.
For a genuine moral dilemma to exist, therefore, it has to involve a
combination ofconflict and loss. The conflict is a rationally irresolvable conflict
between commitments, and the loss is a loss of commitment and thus - in some cases
at least - of integrity. Some proponents of genuine moral dilemmas argue that the
loss involved in cases of genuine moral dilemmas is suggested by the fact that
genuine dilemmas cannot be resolved without moral residue. However, I only discuss
the notion of moral residue in the next section. At this point, it is useful to consider
what the conflict and loss conditions tell us about what differences there would have
to be between apparent and genuine moral dilemmas.
Given the conflict and loss conditions, a genuine moral dilemma would involve
much uncertainty for the agent. The nature ofa dilemma would be such that it
involves a conflict of commitments and that the agent would be uncertain as to which
commitment she should act on and which commitment she should choose to ignore or
undermine. I understand genuine moral dilemmas to be such that they cannot be
rationally resolved, and they cannot be resolved without moral residue or some
adverse affect
13
on the agent. Thus, as I have said, if"genuine moral dilemmas exist
then they necessitate loss for the agent. In this way, genuine moral dilemmas could
not be resolved by the agent appealing to any ethical theory, hierarchical system of
ranking values and commitments, or higher-order principles. This is because such
systems and theories are based on the powers and possibilities of rational
I1 These "commitments" can be crucial to the agent and her identity - a notion I expand on.
12 The idea of "negative emotions of self-assessment" is taken from Williams' paper "Ethical
Consistency" in Problems o/the Self (1982). I later discuss this in more detail as the experience of
moral residue.
13 By that, I mean that the agent is condemned to moral failure. This means that there will be an
adverse affect on the agent's commitments and possibly her integrity, and that she will probably
expenence loss and feelmgs of moral residue.
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deliberation14 and yet, were a genuine moral dilemma to exist, it could not (by
definition) be rationally resolved by deliberation. 15
In what follows I explore the notion of a rationally irresoIvable conflict of
commitments in more detail, and discuss the third condition concerning the type of
situation that it is necessary for an agent to be in if she can be said to be facing a
genuine moral dilemma.
RationaUv irresolvabIe conflicts of commitments
In his book, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Henry Richardson distinguishes
between tragic situations and tragic choices. He argues that although the former
involve severe loss, the latter is what is at stake with genuine moral dilemmas as the
agent faces a situation in which she has to choose between important, conflicting
commitments, and where she faces inevitable loss. The conflict and the choice are
tragic because there is no way that the agent can "arrive at a complacent decision by
commensurating the losses involved in terms ofan adequately representative measure.
The agent faced with a tragic choice cannot hide behind the banner of maximising the
good or minimising the losses.,,16 That is, the agent cannot resolve her conflict by
appealing to any hierarchical system of values, 17 as a tragic choice just is a genuine
moral dilemma.
Given Richardson's claim, in a situation that satisfies the conflict and loss
conditions, it is at least necessary for the agent to recognise (or to be able to
recognise) the validity of each of her clashing claims, and each of the values that pulls
her in opposite directions. 18 The agent thus has to hold equally important
commitments, and recognise them as equally valuable to her. It remains, however,
that a rationally irresoIvable conflict of commitments and inevitable loss is not
sufficient for genuine moral dilemmas to exist. For it to be a genuine moral dilemma,
14 Although I discuss it in due course, and example of such a theory would be Kant's deontology and
hIS theory of the categorical imperative that, he thinks, can be used as a means of determining how to
act in any given situation.
IS This is because of the conflict condition that defines genuine moral dilemmas as involving rationally
irresolvable conflict.
16 Richardson, 1994, Page 115
17 1 discuss this in more detail in due course.
18 Richardson, 1994, Page 114
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it cannot be the case that the agent herself caused the rationally irresolvable conflict of
commitments by committing herself to incoherent principles. 19
Consequently, for it to count as a genuine moral dilemma it has to be the case
that the agent finds herself in a situation in which she cannot control or change the
fact that she will have to choose between two equally important, conflicting
commitments. This is the third condition: what I call the situation condition. Briefly,
I mean that for a conflict to be a genuine moral dilemma it has to be the case that the
agent faces conflict, and loss, and that she does so because she finds herself in a
situation that has been imposed on her by the world and there is thus a degree of
moralluck.2o
As discussed, if genuine moral dilemmas exist, then - in such cases - the
agent cannot alleviate her conflicting commitments or avoid facing loss by appealing
to systems that argue that commitments and values can always be ranked, or arranged
in order of importance. For a conflict to constitute a genuine moral dilemma, it would
not be possible to appeal to a system that, say, valued promise keeping over truth
telling or vice versa. The conflict condition (that the agent's commitments are equally
important and cannot be rationally resolved) can be explained in terms of the situation
condition. In what follows I illustrate the situation condition21 by way ofexample.
Consider the following hypothetical case that would seem to satisfY my
conditions. Let us call the agent Z. Z's brother-in-law was her best friend for years
before Z met and married his brother - her husband. Z's brother-in-law is having an
affair with his wife's best friend. Although Z's husband does not know, Z does know
about the affair, and has confronted her brother in law about it. Z is friendly with
both her brother in law, and his wife. However, when she first finds out about the
affair, the brother-in-law implores her to promise to keep his secret. As Z is his best
friend and her husband's brother, Z agrees, and - in so doing - commits herself to
keeping her word and her brother in law's secret.
19 I discuss the notion of incoherent commitments in the section on integrity. In brief, an agent's
commitments are incoherent if she commits herself to things that naturally conflict, or commits herself
to things for reasons other than the fact that she thinks a certain principle is important, wants to commit
herself to that, and upholds her commitments in the face of challenge because she deems them
important and wants to uphold them.
20 I discuss what I mean by "imposed on the agent by the world" and expand on my understanding of
"moral luck" in due course.
21 I expand on the situation condition at a later stage. It is however importan1 to bear in mind that the
conditions I am presenting overlap significantly.
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It is important to stress that in this case, Z cares for both her brother-in-law and
his wife. Although, when she first agrees to keep her brother-in-Iaw's secret, she does
so because she thinks that it would be for the best and cause the least unhappiness. As
the years of keeping her brother-in-law's secret go by, Z becomes increasingly aware
of the wife's heightened unhappiness, confusion, and stress about her estranged
husband and his suspiciously close relationship with her best friend. After fifteen
years of secrecy, Z is increasingly concerned about his wife, who is driven to
distraction by suspicion, questions, jealousy, and confusion.
As it happens, the wife writes to Z and says that she has no one else to ask for
confirmation of her suspicions about her husband's infidelity, and is distraught with
suspicion. The wife admits that she has suspected her husband's affair with her best
friend for years. However, every time she experiences doubt about her husband's
relationship with her best friend, she is guilt-stricken and feels bad for suspecting the
worst of the two people closest to her. The wife tells Z that she has come to a stage
where she does not know what to believe. She also tells Z that she is so confused that
she no longer knows whether she is being paranoid and unfair, or whether she is being
blind and naive by denying that they are obviously having an affair. She pleads with
Z to tell her the truth so that she may have peace ofmind, and may get on with her life
if they are in love.
In this case, Z has made a promise to her closest friend and brother-in-law:
she is committed to keeping his secret. She is also, however, committed to telling the
truth (especially in a situation where she can see that the truth would benefit the wife
by putting her mind at ease and allowing her to free herself from a life of suspicion,
concern, and unjustified guilt). Z thus faces a conflict between her promise to her
brother-in-law (and closest friend), and her commitment to tell the truth to his
desperate wife: Z's sister-in-law. Z has to choose between a) her commitment to her
brother-in-law (in which case she would undermine her commitment to tell the truth
to her sister-in-law) and, b) her commitment to tell the truth to her sister-in-law (in
which case she would undermine her commitment to her brother-in-law and her
commitment to keep her word).
Z cannot appeal to a system that ranks values, because her values and
commitments are both equally weighted - although they are to different people. Both
of her options are based in some way on a commitment to remain true to herself If
she fails to keep her promise then she is not being true to her word - and thus-
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herself If she fails to tell her sister-in-law the truth (especially when she can see that
she would not only be lying, but would worsen her sister-in-Iaw's constitution by
failing to relieve her from her suspicion, confusion, and concern) then she is not being
true to her sister-iD-law, and thus, herself
In Z's case, it does not seem that a hierarchical system or any value-ranking
system could help her resolve her conflict, as there is no way to rank her
commitments unless she does so arbitrarily.22 It does not make sense to rank her
commitment to keep her promise to protect her brother-in-law, and her commitment
to tell the truth and to help others in need. This is because both commitments are
equally important to Z. The conflict is thus specific to Z, and so appealing to a
general system of rules will not eradicate it. I discuss why hierarchical systems of
value would be arbitrary and why it is that - if genuine moral dilemmas exist - then
Z's conflicting commitments are rationally irresolvable.
In the aforementioned example, Z faces a conflict between two different
commitments. Given that the commitments are different, it would seem that
appealing to a hierarchical system of values could enable Z to resolve the conflict
rationally. In the example, Z is faced with a conflict between remaining true to the
promise she makes her brother-in-law, and remaining true to her commitment to tell
the truth to her sister-iD-law. Let us consider how it would help resolve the conflict if
Z appeals to a ranking system to help her resolve her conflict. Suppose she appeals to
a system that ranks promise keeping above truth telling. Opponents23 of genuine
moral dilemmas would argue that such a system would resolve the apparent dilemma
and could support the claim that genuine moral dilemmas do not exist. This is because
they would argue that as Z could appeal to the system and thereafter choose her
conunitment to keep her brother-in-law's promise over her commitment to telling the
truth to her sister-in-law, she would be able to resolve the conflict (and would thus
only have faced an apparent dilemma). The fact remains, however, that no matter
which option Z chooses, she wiIJ lose something: either her brother-in-Iaw's trust, or
her commitment to tell the truth to her sister-in-law.
Furthermore, ifboth commitments are equally important to Z, then it does not
follow that just because some ethical system ranks promise keeping above truth
telling, Z will necessarily be able to conform her sense of commitment to that system.
~~ By "arbitrary" in this context, I mean the opposite of a choice that can be rationally resolved.
-. Sumott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 72
I1
Her knowledge that a certain system ranks promise keeping above truth telling will
not necessarily change the fact that promise keeping and truth telling are, on the face
of it, equally important to her - especially when she has to choose between her
commitments to two people she loves very much and would not ideally want to
undennine her conunitments to. It thus seems that even in cases where hierarchical
systems can be appealed to, it does not necessarily follow that they will be useful, or
that they will help an agent resolve her conflict.24
It must thus be true that genuine moral dilemmas involve insoluble conflict
and ultimate loss, and are not just cases of the agent being lmcertain as to how to act.
In such cases, that the agent eventually has to choose between her commitments does
not detract from the fact that she faced a genuine moral dilemma, or suggest that her
ability to choose points to the fact that one obligation overrides the other. For
example in the aforementioned case, it seems that whatever Z chooses; she will lose
somethin~5 as she will be forced to undennine one of her conflicting commitments.
That Z experiences conflict (and will inevitably experience a loss of conunitment)
means that she has no way of rationally choosing between her commitments.
Consequently, whatever act Z eventually chooses will be arbitrary as the nature of the
situation and her conunitments is such that she cannot rationally resolve the dilemma.
Apparent dilemmas, on the other hand, are by definition resolvable (although
deciding which commitment to act on may be difficult for the agent, as she may be
plagued by uncertainty), This is made clear by the frequently cited example in Plato's
Republic where the agent has to choose between his commitment to return the weapon
that he borrowed from his friend, and his commitment to prevent his friend (who he
knows is not in his right mind, and who may want to do himself - and possibly others
- hann with the weapon) from harming himself. In such an instance it seems clear
that the agent's commitment to prevent his friend from harming himself overrides his
conunitment to return borrowed goods.
In an apparent dilemma, therefore, it is the case that what may seem to be an
irresolvable conflict, is in fact not. This is because, with enough thought and correct
24 That is not to say that hierarchical systems cannot help to resolve cases where the agent's
commitments conflict, it is rather to say that in cases where something like a hierarchical system can be
appealed to and can successfully enable the agent to resolve her conflict, it is a case of an apparent-
and not a genuine - dilemma This is because if genuine moral dilemmas exist, then they have to be
such that the conflict between the commitments cannot rationallv be resolved
25 Eith.er by breaking her commitment to remain true to the pro~se she made' her sister, or her
comnutment to always tell the truth to her mother.
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deliberation, the agent will realise that one obligation or commitment overrides the
other, and she can thus act on that commitment. 26 In cases ofapparent dilemmas, the
agent can appeal to a hierarchical system of values to determine which commihnent
outweighs the other. For example in Plato's case ofretuming a borrowed weapon to a
friend, the agent could perhaps appeal to a Utilitarian principle and argue that
preventing her friend from harm will ultimately bring about the most happiness. She
could similarly work on the assumption that the preservation of human life is more
important than a commitment to return borrowed goods, and could rationally resolve
her conflicting commihnents in that manner.
It is however less clear how to resolve such a conflict if we consider again the
example of the man is committed to being with his wife during her labour, who is
similarly committed to helping the elderly lady who is hurt. Although unclear, it
could be argued that such an example would also be an apparent dilemma, as the
agent could rationally resolve the conflict no matter how difficult his decision may be.
For example, the man could reason that his commitment to his wife is stronger as she
is his wife, and that - as the elderly woman is a stranger - it is sufficient just to phone
the police on his way to the hospital. My point is that whereas an apparent dilemma is
a question of a difficult decision, a genuine moral dilemma would be a question of a
rationally irresolvable decision.
Ifwe revise the previously discussed example, then the difference between
apparent and genuine moral dilemmas can be illustrated. Assume that the man is
driving the woman to the hospital, but that she is a stranger whose water breaks when
she is getting petrol at the same petrol station as the man. As she cannot drive herself
the man offers to take her to the hospital thus committing himself to helping her in her
time of need. On the way to the hospital the man stops at a traffic intersection and
similarly sees an elderly lady who has been mugged and hurt. He similarly feels the
same sense of commitment as in the previous example to help the elderly lady in her
time of need. The man now has two conflicting commibnents: one to the woman in
labour, one to the elderly lady. In the situation in which he finds himself, he cannot
help both women. He also cannot mediate between those commitments by appealing
to his personal connection to the two ladies, as they are both strangers.
26 It remains, however, that it may be difficult to determine that an apparent dilemma is apparent as
opposed to genwne
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Ifhe leaves the woman in the car to help the elderly lady, her position may be
worsened. Ifhe leaves the elderly lady and decides to drive the woman to the
hospital, then - to the same extent - the elderly lady's position may be worsened. In
such a case, it seems that the man faces a genuine moral dilemma, and there seems to
be no way of rationally resolving the conflict between the two commitments. This
case appears to satisfY the conflict condition. This is because it does not seem that he
can appeal to a higher order principle, or a hierarchical order of value, as the strength
of his commitment is the same and based on the same principle of wanting to help
those in need. It seems that any decision the man makes will be arbitrary. This case
also meets the loss condition, as no matter which action he chooses, he will either
undennine his commitment to help the old lady, or undennine his conunitment to help
the woman in labour - as the situation is such that he calUlot remain true to both
commitments.
As Bas C Van Fraassen argues, if two equally sacred commitments conflict,
then only "an exercise ofthe will can settle the conflict, but not a calculation of
values.,,27 Thus, when an agent is faced with a diletruna and eventually makes her
decision, if the dilemma is genuine then she does so not because she can rationally
arrive at a decision by calculating her values and resolving the conflict, but because
she has to make a decision or else face the worse option of not acting?8
Opponents of genuine moral dilemmas, however, argue against their reality by
denying that the conditions I have argued for could ever be met. To illustrate tills I
briefly consider Kant, Utilitarianism, and W.O. Ross as examples of this side ofthe
debate. My discussion is brief and is merely to illustrate how opponents argue that
dilemmas are onJy apparent, since they are in principle rationally resolvable.
Kant, for example, would argue that obligations and duties can fit into a
system of rules and imperatives in such a way that an action is either right or wrong,
and there can be no such thing as a rationally irresolvable conflict ofcommitments.
This is because an agent has certain perfect obligations and duties that override other
commitments, and certain rules to adhere to that must govern her actions. Kant would
argue that in any given situation there could onJy be one necessary duty or obligation.
He thinks that we should act to universalise the maxim ofour actions. By that, he
27 Van Frassen, 1987, Page 142
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means that we are obliged to act in such a way that our actions can be universalised so
that if everyone acted in the same way then the maxim would still hold.
For example, if we acted on the maxim of promise keeping, then, if everyone
similarly kept their promises, we would presumably have a society in which everyone
kept their promises. Conversely, if we acted on the maxim of making promises and
not keeping them, we could not universalise that without undermining the institution
of promise keeping. This is because ifpeople acted on the latter maxim, then the
institution of promise keeping would collapse because everyone would make lying
promises and no one could trust anyone else when they made promises. Consequently,
Kant might argue that in the example of the man on his way to the hospital- if the
man had promised to take the stranger in labour to the hospital - then that duty would
be categorical and would thus necessarily override his duty to help the elderly lady in
need. As Marcus says, "Kant seems to claim that they (genuine moral dilemmas)
don't really arise, and we are provided no moral grounds for their resolution.,,29
Utilitarianism would argue that there is a single, utilitarian principle of good
which directly or indirectly determines how to act and which means that all moral
conflicts are resolvable and thus, apparent. 30 A Utilitarian could furthennore maintain
that there are first and secondary moral principles, and that no genuine moral conflict
or dilemma can exist as there are always primary and secondary types of principles
involved in apparent conflicts, and that thus the fonner will override the latter and the
conflict will be resolved.31 For example in cases where we have conflicting secondary
commitments like a commitment to help a woman in labour and a commitment to help
a hurt, elderly lady, we need to appea} to something like the primary utditarian
principle of maximising overall happiness. The agent could thus reason in such a case
that helping the woman in labour would maximise overall happiness as it would make
her, her unborn child, and her family happy, whereas helping the elderly lady would
only help the elderly lady and would thus result in less "overall" happiness than ifhe
helped the woman in labour.
28 Not acting would be a worse option as, in cases of genuine moral dilemmas (jf they exist), you face
losing something no matter which option you choose, so if you choose neither, then you end up doing
wrong on two counts.
29
Marcus, 1980, Page 125-126
~o Mill in Gowans, 1987, Page 54
.,1 Ibid. 1987, Page 54-55
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Ross similarly ascribes to the idea of"perfect" commitments,32 but argues that
we also have prima facie commitments, and that, when faced with them, we have to
weigh up which type ofcommitment overrides the other.33 It follows that he similarly
seems to ascribe to the idea that most (if not all) cases ofmoral conflict are apparent
dilemmas that can be rationally resolved by weighing up our prima facie duties, and
that with sufficient consideration the agent will realise that one commitment overrides
the other in the sense that the agent has to act on one commitment. Ross argues that
although the agent may not know what to do, she can know what prima facie duties or
commitments are present in each case.
In the case of the agent faced with a commitment to keep her promise to her
brother-in-law, and her commitment to tell her sister-in-law the tfilth, Ross is likely to
argue that with sufficient contemplation and deliberation Z could arrive at a decision
as to which commitment was "more incumbent" on her than the other.34 She could
thus argue that although promise-keeping may ordinarily outweigh truth-telling, the
fact that she's keeping a promise to hide her brother-in-Iaw's infidelity, makes her
commitment to promise-keeping less binding than her commitment to tell the truth to
her sister-in-law. This is because the agent could reason that her brother-in-law was
in the wrong to have an affair with his wife's best friend. She could also reason that
because she made the promise to her brother-in-law on the assumption that his wife
would not ask about her husband's infidelity, her commitment to her brother-in-law is
less important tban ber commitment to tell the truth to her sister-in-law when she asks
whether her husband is being unfaithful with ber best friend.
Ross thus thinks that the agent needs to take all the factors and circumstances
of the specific situation that she is faced with into account, and that all conflicts can
be resolved with deliberation - no matter how irresolvable the agent's conflicting
commitments may appear. He would thus deny that genuine moral dilemmas exist on
the basis that all moral dilemmas can be rationally resolved by deliberation even in
cases where what the agent ought to do remains unclear.
Opponents
35
of genuine dilemmas would furthermore argue that as all "genuine
moral dilemmas," are in fact apparent dilemmas,36 the agent may seem to be faced
32 Those commitments that naturally override other commitments, as they are - by nature - more
important. .
33 Ross in Gowans, 1987, Page 86
34 Ibid. 1897, Page 86.
35 S'. rnnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 72
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with a genuine dilemma because she is, for example, limited in her capacity for
rational deliberation, and does not always have the ability to be able to see which
commitment overrides the other. They also claim that as all dilemmas ultimately end
with the agent deciding to act on one ofher commitments, that she was not actually
faced with a genuine dilemma. They base this claim on the assumption that the fact
that the agent eventually chooses commitment A over commitment B or vice versa,
simply means that one commitment naturally overrode the other (and that the
dilemma was thus only apparent after the fact, the mere fact, that the agent did make a
choice shows that there was no dilemma).37
At this stage of the argument it is important to point out that the conflict and
loss conditions alone are insufficient for a genuine moral dilemma to exist. This is
because opponents ofgenuine moral dilemmas could argue that although the
necessary conditions of conflict and loss are satisfied, it remains that (as mentioned
earlier) the fault lies with the agent. If the agent found herself in a situation that
satisfied the conditions of conflict and loss, but it was her own fault, then her dilemma
would be apparent, and not genuine. It follows that the situation condition is needed
to ensure that the agent actually would face a genuine moral dilemma, and that the
fault of her situation lies with the world.
Opponents of genuine moral dilemmas, however, might deny that the situation
condition could ever in truth be met. I now turn to this condition and its relation to
the concept ofmoral luck. Again, this discussion is hypothetical - a discussion of
what the world would have to be like, were genuine moral dilemmas to exist.
The situation condition
Bemard Williams suggests that what is wrong in cases of conflicting commitments is
a combination ofthe principles that an agent commits herself to, and the situation in
which she finds herself. It is thus the fact that an agent has numerous commitments,
coupled with the fact that she could find herself in a situation where those
commitments conflict, that can result in a genuine moral dilemma. This links to the
conception of "moral luck," because given that the situation affects the agent as much
36 Ibid. ]988 Page 95
37 I think that all these points from the opponents can be overcome. This will become clear in the later
chapters.
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as her diverse commitments may - it follows that she may be faced with a situation in
which she cannot avoid irresolvable conflicting commitments. That is, with a range
or combination of commitments and a situation imposed on the agent by the world
(forcing her to choose between two equally important, conflicting commitments), she
will confront a genuine moral dilemma.
As Williams says, "That there is nothing that one decently, honourably, or
adequately can do seems a kind of truth as firmly independent ofthe will and
inclination as anything in morality.,,38 The suggestion is that no matter what the agent
may ideally want, or be inclined to do, and no matter how adept she is at rationally
deliberating, it remains that it is possible (unot likely) that she will fmd herself in a
situation with militating circumstances that condemn her to a conflict of conunitments
and inevitable wrongdoing.
In this way, although the conflict and loss conditions are necessary conditions
ofa genuine moral dilemma, they are not sufficient. If they were sufficient, then
opponents could simply argue that such conditions are - objectively speaking -
rationally resolvable. For genuine moral dilemmas to be real, therefore, we have to
include the situation condition and it has to be true that they involve a degree of moral
luck and mitigating39 circumstances that are such that the agent cannot systematically
avoid conflict and IOSS.4O
One of the consequences of the conflict condition is that the agent inevitably
ends up doing something wrong. That she inevitably ends up doing something wrong
is caused by the situation condition. According to the situation condition, if genuine
moral dilemmas exist, then they include a situation with militating circumstances that
place the agent in a situation that she does not have complete control over and in
which she is forced to make decisions that she may not ordinarily have to. It must thus
be a feature of genuine moral dilemmas that they tend to be imposed on the agent by
the world, 41 and that it is not solely the agent's fault if she finds herself faced with an
irresolvable conflict of commitments.
By "imposed on the agent by the world" I mean that there seems to be a
degree of moral luck in cases ofgenuine dilemmas. This is because of the situation
38VVilli~, 198J,Page75
39 By "mitigating circumstance" [ mean a circumstance that is not completely in the agent's control,
and that bears some responsibility for the choice she faces.
40 VVill~ in Gowans, 1987, pageI77
41 Williams, 198], Page ]69
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that the agent finds herself in - and her conunitments - give rise to the conflict. The
agent thus does not have complete control over the situation, because she finds herself
faced with choices that are dictated by the type of situation or circumstances in which
she finds herself Consequently, given the situation condition, opponents cannot argue
that genuine moral dilenunas could not exist on the basis that the agent is solely
responsible for getting herself into situations in which her conunitments conflict.
According to the situation condition, the agent is forced - by the nature of the
situation in which she finds herself - to act in such a way that she will inevitably do
something wrong. This contrasts with a case in which the conflict and loss conditions
are satisfied, but the situation condition is not. In such a case opponents could argue
that the agent and her colTlJTlitments is responsible for the situation she finds herself
in, and that consequently her conflict is rationally resolvable and she thus does not
face a genuine moral dilenuna. I now illustrate an instance that would meet the
situation condition and the idea that the agent is not always solely responsible for
circumstances in which she faces an irresolvable conflict of commitments with the
following hypothetical example: the Hostage case.
Imagine that a madman is holding a group of hostages. The madman picks
out one person and demands that she choose someone to be shot so that the police
take the madman seriously and give him what he wants. The madman stipulates that if
she does not choose somebody, then everyone will be shot, and she will have to watch
her fellow hostages being killed and then be shot herself In such a case, the agent has
no rational way ofresolving the conflict between the commitments, as she has an
equally weighted conunitment to preserve each of the lives of the strangers before her.
She is in a situation in which - no matter which of her fellow hostages she chooses to
be shot - she will have done wrong by that person and by herself The agent has not
chosen or caused her current situation. Her circumstances thus meet the situation
condition in that the situation she finds herself in is imposed on her by the world and
is caused by circumstances out of her direct control. She has no control over the
madman, his plans, or the fact that chance was such that she is in the same place as
the madman at the time as he decides to hold a group of people hostages. As Sirnon
Blackburn remarks, "it is going to be hellish" whatever the agent does, or however
she chooses to act.42
42 Blackburn in Mason, 1996, page 137
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In such a case, the decision that the agent has to make is thus based on factors
outside of her control. That is, she would ideally want to be in a situation in which
she did not face having to choose someone to be shot, and in which her own life was
not in danger or in the hands ofa madman. It remains, however, that she is in an
extreme situation, and she has to make a choice: this is the situation condition. The
situation condition thus renders the agent's conflict rationally irresolvable. As Marcus
argues, in situations ofgenuine moral dilemmas, it must be true that ''your are damned
if you do and you are damned ifyou don't.',43 The situation must therefore be such
that the agent has no option that will enable her to avoid doing wrong and
undermining one of her commitments. According to the situation condition, the world
lands the agent in a hellish situation. Now I have discussed what the three conditions
are that a genuine moral dilemma would have to meet were it to exist, I go on to
discuss the conditions together.
All three conditions together are sufficient for a genuine moral dilemma to
exist. These conditions together show that if genuine moral dilemmas exist, then they
are such that the agent cannot "act for the best", as there is no "best" option available.
Ifthere were a "best" option, then the agent would not be facing a genuine moral
dilemma in the first place. Furthermore, the very notion of the existence of a "best"
option presupposes that there is a way of rationally resolving the conflicting
commitments. It would only make sense to talk of a "best" option if the available
options could be ordered hierarchically into categories like "poor," "good," "better,"
and "best." It remains, however, that in cases of genuine moral dilemmas, it must be
true that the nature ofthe conflicting commitments involved is such that they are
equally strong and can neither be hierarchically ordered and thus nor rationally
resolved.
If the three conditions were satisfied, it would similarly not make sense to
talk ofmaking an "all things considered" decision. No matter how much the agent
considers her options and weighs up the strength ofher conflicting commitments, for
it to constitute a genuine moral dilemma, it must be true to say that she will come no
closer to being able to make her decision. As WilIiams argues, in cases that appear to
meet the situation condition, it is often the case that "the more one concentrates on the
dilemma, the more pressing the claims of each side become.'M Although the agent
43 M . Goarcus ill wans, Page 127
44 Williams, 1982, Page 172
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will evenhJally have to make a choice (given the sihmtion condition), that choice wiJl
be essentially arbitrary,45 and making it will affect her adversely. I say that because
she will be forced to undennine at least one of her commihnents, and will thus be
forced to lose something. As Greenspan argues, a genuine moral dilemma is a case in
which all of the agent's alternatives, through no fault ofher own, turn out to be
wrong.46
My hypothetical hostage case illustrates the conditions ofconflict, loss, and
sintation working together. The choice has been imposed on her by the sintation (the
fact of having to make such a choice at all). Second, the choice of who will be shot
will be arbitrary, as the woman knows nothing about the people with whom she is
kept hostage, and cannot rationally work out which person it would be "best" to
choose to be shot. Third, no matter who the agent chooses, she will be forced to
ignore her commihnent to prevent doing harm to others, and to preserve human life.
Consequently, no matter how she acts, she will be doing wrong and there will be a
loss of some kind.47 It follows that genuine moral dilemmas, are cases "where overall
wrongdoing is inevitable. ,,48
Candidates for genuine moral dilemmas
Proponents argue that a number ofd'ifferent cases count as genuine moral dilemmas.
Although dilemmas can involve a conflict between more than two commitments, for
the sake of argument I concentrate solely on situations in which the agent faces a
conflict between two important commitments.
According to my analysis, the candidates for genuine moral dilemmas that I
outline in what follows must fulfil the conditions of confuct, loss and sintation. My
route to defending the existence ofgenuine moral dilemmas is not, however, to show
how each of these cases fulfiJ the required conditions, at least not yet, since I wish to
argue that an analysis of moral residue can reveal whether or not these conditions can
be met in particular cases. I focus exclusively on personal, rather than interpersonal,
45 Opponents - as I mentioned - would deny that any choice was arbitrary and that genuine moral
dilemmas exist, and would argue that in making a choice the agent shows that the case they were facing
was not a genuine, but an apparent, dilemma.
46 Greenspan, 1995, Page 9
:7 I spell out the loss condition in the course of the section on integrity.
g Zimmerman, 1996, Page 208
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dilemmas. That is to say, the cases of conflict I consider involve only a single agent.
I shall not be considering cases ofmulti-person conflict.
It seems, however, that within this group, the cases that proponents take to
be genuine dilemmas can be loosely divided into types - or candidates. In this
section, I give a brief account of these types to indicate the variety of candidates for
. I dil 49genume mora emmas.
The first type of genuine moral conflict that I discuss is the difference
between epistemic and ontological dilemmas. Epistemic conflicts include cases
where an agent is faced with two conflicting, different commitments, and she cannot
discern which commitment is more binding in her current situation. An example of
this would be Plato's agent with the weapon and the choice between returning that
weapon to his volatile friend who may harm himself, and undermining his
commitment to return the borrowed weapon to his friend. Such an example is an
apparent dilemma, as the agent may only be unsure ofwhich commitment takes
precedence, and is not in a situation where both of his commitments are necessarily
rationally irresolvable. An ontological conflict, on the other hand, would be a conflict
where the agent faces a situation in which she cannot rationally resolve her
commitments, and in which she is faced with a conflict of two commitments - neither
of which overrides the other. An example of this would be the Hostages case, where
the agent has an equal commitment to preserve the lives ofall ofher fellow hostages.
Tragic dilemmas are a type of genuine moral conflict. In cases where the
agent is faced with a tragic moral conflict, no matter what action the agent chooses,
her decision will essentially have tragic consequences. Tragic moral dilemmas are the
worst types ofgenuine moral conflict in that their consequences are the most severe.
This is because "tragic" usually implies a fatality, disaster or calamity of some sorts -
and thus the effects ofthe agent's decision are bound to be grievous in some way.
Tragic moral conflicts are consequently the most distressing for the agent, as her
actions ultimately result in serious consequences. The aforementioned Hostages case
is an example of a genuine moral conflict involving a tragic dilemma or situation, as
49 Although I refer 10 the candidates as "dilemmas" I do not assume that genuine moral dilemmas exist
in so doing - I am rather just representing possible candidates that could meet the sufficient conditions
of a genuine moral dilemma
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is the example in William Styron's Sophie 's Choice5o where Sophie is forced to
choose between which of her two children will be killed.
Another candidate for genuine moral conflicts includes cases where the agent
faces similar conflicting commitments that have less dire consequences. For the sake
of argument, I call these mild dilemmas. 51 An example of a mild dilemma would be if,
for example, the agent is a policeman and his brother becomes a drug addict because
their family life was abusive. If the policeman comes across his brother during a raid
on a local club, he will have conflicting commitments. The first is his commitment as
a policeman to arrest his brother for being under the influence ofdrugs, the second is
his commitment as a loving brother who relates to his brother's plight and
understands his drug abuse despite the fact that he may not condone it. Another
example would be an agent's commitment as a witness under oath to tell the truth, and
her commitment to remain loyal to a loved one that has committed a crime.
The aforementioned examples are also cases ofobligation dilemmas, as the
agent faces a conflict between two actions that she is committed to doing, although
she cannot do both. In this way, obligation dilemmas are another candidate ofgenuine
moral conflicts.
Prohibition dilemmas are also candidates for genuine moral conflicts. They
include cases like that in Sophie 's Choice, and the hostage case: cases where the agent
is faced with a choice between two actions that she would ideally not want to do, or
that she feels she should not do in the sense that she is prohibited from doing it as it
opposes her commitments. Prohibition dilemmas are thus such that the options
available to the agent directly oppose her commitments. They are genuine moral
conflicts because the agent is forced to choose one of the actions that she does not
want to do, because of the militating circumstances of the situation in which she finds
herself.
It is important to clarify that not all mild dilemmas are obligation dilemmas,
nor are all tragic dilemmas prohibition dilemmas. Various types of situation seem to
fit the conditions ofa genuine moral conflict. That is not to say that genuine moral
dilemmas necessarily exist, but that, if they did then they would have to fulfil the
three aforementioned conditions, and could do so in the ways outlined by the artificial
so I discuss this case in detail in my final section.
S! Although it ~s contentious whether any dilemma could be "mild" for the agent concerned, I mean
only that - unlike tragic dilemmas - mild dilemmas do not involve fatalities.
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types I am discussing. I now discuss the types of genuine moral dilemmas to which
proponents allude.
Some proponents of genuine moral dilemmas distinguish between obligation
and prohibition dilemmas (the former being such that more than one action is
obligatory and the agent cannot do both, the latter being such that all actions available
to the agent are forbidden although the agent has to choose one action) and argue that
either one or the othe~2 are genuine moral dilemmas. It remains, however, that the
importance ofa moral dilemma is that it involves tragic choice. It also forces the
agent to choose between conflicting commitments that are not rationally resolvable.
The choice the agent faces is tragic because she necessarily faces undermining her
commitments and, in some cases, compromising her integrity. In obligation
dilemmas, the agent has to undermine one of her commitments in order to act on one
of her conflicting obligations. In prohibition dilemmas, the agent is similarly forced
to undermine her commitments, as no matter which action she chooses it will be
contrary to how she would want to act, or how she feels committed to act. In cases of
genuine moral conflict, therefore, the agent will necessarily be forced to undermine
her commitments and - in so doing - face compromising her integrity. 53 I now discuss
another type of moral dilemma to which Williams and E. 1. Lemmon refer.
Williams and Lemmon discuss a conception ofdilemmas as cases where the
agent both ought - and ought not - to do the same thing.54 That is, the agent is
committed to doing a certain action for some reason, and is yet similarly committed
not to do the same action in respect ofother reasons. 55 I call these single alternative
dilemmas, or, symmetrical dilemmas. Such dilemmas are made apparent in classical
tragedies where, for example in Aeschylus' Oresteia,56 Orestes is committed to
avenging his father who was killed by his mother, and yet is simultaneously
committed to refraining from murdering his mother Clytemnestra. To take another
example, a husband whose wife is raped and murdered by robbers may feel
committed to avenging his wife and harming her attackers. He may similarly be
committed to avoiding inflicting harm on others or committed to refraining from
acting on vengeance.
52 And not both.
53 A notion I discuss in more detail in the next section of my paper.
54 L . Gemmon In owans, 1987, Page 105
55 Williams, 1982, Page 171
56 Aeschylus, 1989, The Libation Bearers.
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To summarise, if genuine moral dilemmas exist, then they have to fulfil three
primary conditions. Firstly, it has to be true that the agent is faced with a situation in
which she has to choose between conflicting commitments that are not rationally
resolvable. Secondly, it has to be true that no matter what course of action the agent
takes, she will necessarily undermine at least one of her commitments and - in so
doing - face a loss of that commitment and possibly ofher integrity as well. Thirdly,
it has to be true that the situation condition is met. That is, the agent has to be faced
with a situation that she did not choose to be in, over which she has no control, and in
which she is forced (by the militating circumstances) to choose between two equally
important, conflicting commitments that cannot rationally be resolved.
Among the candidate cases for genuine moral dilemmas, I have identified a
number ofdifferent types: tragic dilemmas, mild dilemmas, prohibition dilemmas,
and obligation dilemmas. Opponents, however, claim that these would be examples
of apparent dilemmas as the conflict is always rationally resolvable, as discussed
above. In the following chapter, I go on to discuss the moral residue argument as a
way ofattempting to overcome this claim.
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Chapter 2
In this chapter, my objectives are twofold. First, after a brief account of the concept
ofmoral residue, and a more detailed look at what kinds ofemotions are included in
moral residue, I examine the moral residue argument for the existence of genuine
moral dilemmas. Ruth Marcus, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Bernard Williams are
prominent among those who interpret the moral residue argument as supporting the
fact that irresolvable conflicts of moral commitments are possible. As it stands, this
argument is open to at least two damaging objections. Outlining these objections
made by Patricia Greenspan, Terence McConnell, and WaIter Sinnott-Armstrong,
forms the second objective of this chapter. In chapter three, I outline Lynn McFall's
conception of integrity, and set up my argument that the moral residue argument can
be salvaged despite the objections. In the final chapter, I make a case for the
existence ofgenuine moral dilemmas, by interpreting the moral residue argument in
terms of the independent standard of integrity.
What is moral residue?
Proponents of genuine moral dilemmas sometimes appeal to the agent's experience of
"moral residue." Moral residue is the term given to the negative emotions an agent
experiences after a choice has been made andlor an action performed. Moral residue
includes negative emotions of self-assessment like guilt, shame, and remorse, and can
manifest itself in the form ofapologies, attempts at compensation, and attempts to
make up to people.
Moral residue includes all cases of negative emotions of self-assessment. It
is caused by cases where the agent has acted or made a decision that she thinks is
wrong or something that violates her commitments in some way. That is, the agent
will experience moral residue in cases where she thinks that she has done something
morally reprehensible or something that opposes the way that she would ideally like
to act, or the way that she thinks others would expect her to act. For example if an
agent (like the aforementioned case of agent Z) prides herself on being honest and she
ends up lying for some reason or another - even if she only tells a white lie, she may
experience moral residue as she sees herself as having done something in direct
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opposition to the very thing she prides herself on being: honest. Such an agent may
experience guilt or shame or remorse, for violating something she deems important
and has committed herself to being. She may also attempt to make up to the person
that she lied to, and may end up admitting her falsehood in order to alleviate some of
the guilt, shame, or remorse that she felt at having lied in the first place.
Thus, moral residue is not only a question of the negative emotions because
the agent thinks that she has done something wrong, but is also caused by some type
ofconflict. In order for the agent to judge herself as having done something wrong
she would have to recognise a tension between what she did and what she thought she
ought to do. For example, an agent who prides herself on being honest would
experience a tension between her commitment to being honest and the temptation that
she experiences to tell a white lie. Similarly, an agent who commits adultery and
experiences moral residue - although she may not have been committed to fidelity as
such - would experience the residue on account of the fact that committing adultery is
in conflict with what she thinks she ought to do, or how she would ideally like to act.
Moral residue thus includes any case where an agent experiences a conflict
between what she ought to do and what she did do, and the negative emotions of self-
assessment like guilt, shame, and remorse that occur as a result of her having done
something that she thinks is wrong. I consider these three emotions specifically,
because the notion of residue implies that the emotion stays with the agent and
plagues her, and the nature of guilt, shame, and remorse is that they are lingering
emotions that serve as a reminder to the agent that she did wrong.
It follows that moral residue is just the negative emotions an agent
experiences after having made a bad choice or after having done something immoral
or contrary to her ideals or commitments. It is thus caused by the agent's actions or
decisions in cases where she violates a commitment57 to herself or others.
Consequently, the agent need not be in a situation of genuine moral dilenuna in order
to experience moral residue. It just needs to be the case that she undermines her
personal ideals and commitments, or acts in a way that she recognises as wrong, or
morally reprehensible.
57 The implication is that in violating a commitment she would have faced some sort of conflict as
discussed above.
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Furthennore, moral residue can be felt appropriately and inappropriately. 58 It
seems to be appropriate when the agent has actually violated a commitment and done
something wrong, and it appears to be inappropriate if the agent experiences emotions
like guilt, shame, and remorse in response to something that she did and did not
violate a commitment. Although I discuss the concept of appropriate and
inappropriate moral residue at a later stage, at this point I merely want to indicate that
there is a difference between them. While the latter occurs when the agent has done
nothing wrong, the fonner is when the agent actually does something wrong and
experiences shame, guilt, or remorse because ofthat.59
Moral residue is thus just the negative emotions of self-assessment that an
agent experiences when she undennines or violates a commitment, and does
something wrong. In order to demonstrate the nature ofmoral residue, I give a brief
account of the emotions of shame, guilt, and remorse. Thereafter I discuss how the
moral residue argument works, and how it can be used to support the existence of
genuine moral dilemmas. I then discuss the two primary objections levelled against
the efficacy of the moral residue argument.
The emotions of moral residue
The emotions involved in moral residue are all negative emotions of self-assessment.
In this section, I discuss the three primary emotions of moral residue: guilt, shame and
remorse.
60
In so doing I consider the similarities and differences between these
emotions and give examples of cases where such emotions can arguably be
experienced appropriately and inappropriately. I also begin to examine how the
emotions an agent experiences can reflect on the agent herself and on the nature of the
situation in which she finds herself
Our common sense conception of the emotions of moral residue is that
emotions like shame, guilt, and remorse, are negative and sometimes punitive. When
we feel remorse, we tend to want to make up for what we did wrong and we feel bad
S8 What conditions appropriate moral residue would have to meet is a matter of debate. For the present
purposes of my discussion I merely represent the moral residue argument as it stands. I however spell
out how proponents and opponents have understood the notion of appropriately experienced moral
residue in due course.
S9 I give an account of what constitutes doing something wrong at a later stage.
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for doing something that we perhaps think we ought not to have done. Shame, on the
other hand, is something we tend to feel when we are embarrassed about our conduct,
and want to hide what we did from others. Guilt, on the other hand, is something we
tend to feel when we have done something wrong and we hate ourselves for that. In
what follows I discuss the nature of these emotions in more detail.
Remorse is a negative feeling that the agent experiences when she has done
something wrong, and recognises that she has done something wrong. It is thus only
inappropriate when it is based on ignorance or mistake. This is based on the
assumption that an agent can only experience remorse if she has consciously chosen
to undennine her commitments for whatever reason. The conflict arises because the
agent has chosen to act in a way that is in opposition with how she thinks she ought to
act, or how she would ideally like to act. For example, it seems appropriate for an
agent committed to fidelity6J to experience remorse if she has wittingly seduced a
married man to whom she is very attracted, while it would be inappropriate for an
agent to experience remorse if the agent were attracted to a married man and seduced
him, but the man had recently proposed to her and promised her that he was not
married and wanted to many her. In the latter case, the woman would have been
ignorant that she was undermining her commitment to fidelity, because she herself
was single, and was under the impression that the man was too.
Sinnott-Annstrong argues that remorse has to be experienced in response to
violating a commitment, because such a requirement would generate the idea that an
agent "should" feel remorse for a certain act or decision she has done or made. The
agent thus has to be causally or morally responsible in order to experience an emotion
of moral residue like remorse. That is to say that the agent has to have done
something wrong, and has to be responsible in the sense that she actually did
something wrong or wronged someone. Consider the example ofa conservationist (in
a bad, reckless, mood) who flicks her cigarette into the bush and burns an ecosystem.
Committed as she is to conservation, the remorse she experiences after having
destroyed an ecosystem is appropriate.
60 That is not to say that there are not other negative emotions of self-assessment that could similarly be
categorised as moral residue. To the same extent, things like apologies and attempts at compensation
are also regarded as moral residue - although I limit my focus to guilt, shame, and remorse specifically.
61 A single agent who is committed to being faithful herself (although that does not directly apply as
she is.single) ~d who is committed to refraining from breaking up other people's relationships or
temptlOg mamed men to stray from their wives. She is thus committed to fidelity in general, and
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It follows that although remorse is a negative emotion of self-assessment, it
can be experienced appropriately or inappropriately. As Sinnott-Annstrong argues,
"remorse implies a belief that a moral requirement was violated,,,62 and thus it is felt
appropriately when a moral requirement or a commitment actually was violated or
undennined. I now go on to discuss shame and guilt as the other two examples of
moral residue. In so doing I contrast their differences and similarities, and consider
them in relation to remorse.
Williams, claims that both shame and guilt are similarly negative emotions of
self-assessment - emotions of"remainder." Shame and guilt are thus such that they
are concerned with the agent's perception of herself If an agent has done something
wrong or violated a commitment, then she will experience shame, guilt, or remorse,
because she judges herself negatively as having done something wrong.
Such emotions require what Williams refers to as an internal observer63/a
"normative self-conception." All three emotions involve self-assessment and the agent
judging herself for how she acts, and how she decides to act in any given situation
according to her normative self-conception. For example, if an agent thinks that
being civil to strangers is important, then in the likelihood that she is harassed one day
and she is uncivil or rude to a stranger, she may experience moral residue after having
judged herself as acting in a way that opposes how she would ideally want to act, and
how she thinks she should act. She will experience the residue because she thinks that
being uncivil is unnecessary and wrong, and because rudeness is a trait that she
disparages in others. It is thus plausible to say that her internal observer judges
rudeness as a reprehensible trait that the agent herself would not like to possess.
Unlike remorse and guilt, shame differs slightly as the internal observer
involved in shame depends not only on the agent's conception of herself, but on her
conception of how others would judge her. Although shame, like guilt and remorse,
is involved in the agent's conception of herself, it also requires an audience and is
involved in others' conception of the agent. Shame is thus connected to the agent's
social situation: her internal observer is the product ofthe society in which she finds
herself, and the people that she judges therein.64
would feel that she bad done wrong if she was either an accomplice in adultery and - say - broke up a
marriage, or if she was unfaithful herself.
62 S'mnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 47
63 WiJliams, 1993, Page 84
64 Nehamas, 1996, Page 6
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Williams sees shame as a combination of the relation between an individual's
successes and failures, and the standards ofthe community.65 Shame is thus a
question of the agent's perceptions of herself, her perceptions ofothers, her
perceptions ofwhat others think of her, and her being judged for doing things
contrary to what she would like to do.66 To illustrate how an emotion like shame
works, consider the hypothetical example ofan agent who thinks that stealing is
wrong, and who witnesses someone who steals cutlery from restaurants. Not only
does the agent consider stealing morally reprehensible (and so she commits herself to
refraining from stealing) but her father owns a restaurant and has to deal with the
effects ofpeople who steal cutlery from restaurants. The agent will thus know that
people who steal cutlery from restaurants make the restaurant owner's life very
difficult and expensive as he is always having to replace the stolen pieces ofcutlery
and thus has difficulty making ends meet.
In such a case, the agent is likely to perceive that stealing cutlery from
restaurants is wrong, and that people who steal cutlery from restaurants are
thoughtless, dishonest people. The agent will thus experience shame if she ever slips
a Spur steak knife into her bag because - for example - she was dared to by her
mends, or because she does not want to spend her allowance on buying her own steak
knives. To the same extent, the agent may reason that because she judges people who
steal cutlery from restaurants (or who steal in general) as bad, thoughtless people, that
when she steals the steak knife from Spur that other people may judge her as a bad,
thoughtless, dishonest person. She will thus feel shame at such an action because a)
she judges stealing as wrong, b) she has seen the effects of stealing cutlery from
restaurants on people who own restaurants, c) (because of b) she has judged people
who steal cutlery from restaurants as bad, dishonest, thoughtless people, and d) she
assumes (because ofc) that others will judge her as a dishonest, bad, thoughtless
person.
Williams' notion of the internalised other thus includes social expectations
such as the agent's conception of how she should live, and how her actions affect the
world and others therein. It also includes the principles to which she is committed.
6S W i1Jiams, ] 993, Page 81
66 Although this could include being judged by others, within the context of my discussion about the
emotions of moral residue, I focus on the agent being judged by her "internalised observer" and the
way her :'intemalised observer" thinks others would judge her for her actions, as opposed to how others
actually Judge her for her actions.
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Although all three emotions are negative emotions of self-assessment, shame is a
narcissistic emotion in that it is focused on the agent. Given that, the agent in the
Hostages case would feel shame if she chose a fellow hostage to be shot, because she
would judge herself as having done something shameful, and she would think that
those around her would similarly judge her for having done something wrong. 67 She
would also look to those she admires and respects, and see that they are not the type
of people who would choose one of their fellow hostages to be shot, and would
experience shame as a result of failing the hostage that she eventually chose to be
shot, and for having violated her commitments and ideals. It follows that shame (like
guilt and remorse) draws on self-criticism and derision for the agent's inability to live
up to her personal ideals and commitments.
Unlike shame, guilt is less narcissistic as it is more focussed on what the
agent has done to others, and less focussed on the agent herself, and what she thinks
that others will think of her and how she acts. Consequently, indignation, reparation,
and forgiveness tend to be associated with guilt as the agent tries to make up for the
wrong that she did to others.68 This is because guilt is the product of the agent's
attitude to herself, and to what she sees herself as having done to others. If we
consider the agent committed to fidelity who wittingly seduces a married man, if that
agent destroys his marriage, she may experience guilt for the damage that she caused
his family and the hurt and disillusionment she caused his wife and children. The
internalised version of guilt differs from the internalised other of shame, as the latter
is an observer or "watcher," while the former is a "victim" or "enforcer.,,69 Guilt is
thus a more punitive emotion than shame, and although both emotions linger with the
agent, guilt serves to remind her constantly of the wrong she did to others.
Given that guilt is related to feelings of anger, the focus of guilt is on the
agent's victim. For example, if the agent in the Hostages case felt guilt, it would be
because she had chosen one of her fellow hostages to be shot. It is plausible that the
agent's guilt would be the result ofher hating herself for a) being chosen by the
Madman to choose a fellow hostage, b) for harming the person that she chose, c) for
choosing that person, and d) for the wrong she would have done to his family and
friends by choosing him over another person. The agent may also experience guilt, as
67 Will'lams, 1993, Page 81.
68 Williams, 1993, page 91
69 Ibid. 1993, Page 219
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she was angry with herself for being unable to convince the Madman that no one
needed to be shot. It follows that if the agent experienced guilt as opposed to shame,
she would be plagued with anger with herself for her action and for the wrong that she
caused her fellow hostage. Ifwe consider the case of the agent who steals the Spur
steak knife, then she would experience guilt if she came to realise the wrong that her
action caused the restaurant owner, the difficult position that it put him in financially
and practically,70 and if she resented herself for putting him in such a difficult
position.
Guilt is thus "rooted in hearing, the sound in oneself of the voice of
judgement,,,7] and is an awareness that the agent has done something wrong and failed
to live up to her commitments in some way - thus making her angry with herself for
failing to live up to those commitments and doing wrong to others in the process. As
Gibbard argues, guilt is the "first-person counter part of anger,,,n as the agent realises
that she is to blame for undermining her commitments and acting in a way that she
ideally would not want to. It follows that "to feel guilty is to suffer.,,73
It remains, however, that all emotions ofmoral residue involve a degree of
suffering for the agent. Whereas guilt and remorse can be experienced in response to
the agent violating her respect for others by undermining some commitment or doing
something wrong, shame can be experienced when the agent violates her own self-
respect by undermining a commitment or doing something wrong. Thus, the agent
who feels guilt or remorse suffers because she has wronged someone else, while the
agent who experiences shame, suffers because she has wronged herself and let herself
down in some way.
The emotions of moral residue are all emotions involved in the agent's
conception that she has done wrong and undermined or violated a commitment in
some way. They are ftuthermore such that an agent cannot experience them unless
she sees herselfas connected with the action that she does or the decision that she
makes, in such a way that it reflects poorly on her. 14
70 thBy at I mean the extra money he would have to make to afford to replace the steak knives, and the
~1\.tra effort that he would have to go to order extra knives, and fmd the right make etc.
I Williams, 1993, Page 89
72 Ibid. 1993, Page 89
73 Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 50
74 Ibid. 1988, Page 30
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Now that I have given a brief accOlmt of the types ofemotions involved in
moral residue, and have outlined what moral residue is, I go on to discuss the moral
residue argument, how it works, and what the main objections to it are.
The Moral Residue Argument
In this section, I start with a brief outline of the moral residue argument. I then
provide a thought experiment: the Sadistic Hijackers case, in order to illustrate what
moral residue is, and how the moral residue argument works. In so doing I discuss
what I take to be the main aspects of the moral residue argument, and draw on the
accOlmt ofmoral residue given by SilUlott-Annstrong, Williams, and Marcus.
The moral residue argument turns on the assumption that we can learn from
reflection on our moral experience75 and is based on the reasoning that the emotional
reaction ofappropriate moral residue in response to either alternative that an agent
may face, is evidence that she faced a genuine moral dilemma. This is based on the
understanding that the agent's residue would not make sense ifshe had not faced a
genuine moral conflict in which both of her commitments were rationally irresolvable.
By that I mean that in a situation where an agent faces a choice between A and B,
(where if she chooses A she will experience appropriate moral residue for
undermining B, and if she chooses B she will experience appropriate moral residue
for undermining A) it shows that neither ofher commitments overrode each other and
that she thus faced a rationally irresolvable conflict ofcommitments.
In order to discuss the moral residue argument in detail, I discuss the four
points that Terence McConnell argues have to be true of the moral residue argument if
it is to work. After discussing the Sadistic Hijackers case, I link the aspects of the
moral residue argument to the conditions that a genuine moral dilemma would have to
meet were it to exist. This explains how the moral residue argument is used as
evidence to support the existence ofgenuine moral dilemmas.
McConnell argues that proponents must show the following four things to be
true for the moral residue argument to support the existence of genuine moral
dilemmas: 1) when the agent acts, she experiences remorse, shame or guilt, 2) that she
experiences these emotions is appropriate, 3) had she acted on the other alternative,
she would also have experienced remorse, shame, or guilt, and 4) in the latter case
75 Gowans in Mason, 1996, Page 203
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these emotions would have been equally appropriate76. Given that the moral residue
would be appropriate no matter which alternative the agent chooses, it follows that the
agent would necessarily do wrong no matter how she acts. That the agent's residue
would be appropriate, and that she would necessarily do wrong, supports the existence
of genuine moral dilemmas. This is because only a situation that meets the sufficient
conditions ofa genuine moral dilemma could account for the fact that the agent
experiences appropriate moral residue and would necessarily do wrong no matter
which option she chooses?7
If the agent would necessarily do wrong no matter which alternative she
chooses or how she acts, then she would be in a situation in which she faces a choice
between (at least) two equally important, conflicting commitments that cannot be
rationally resolved. The moral residue argument thus turns on the claim that there are
some situations of conflict where an agent will appropriately feel negative emotions
of moral residue no matter which alternative she chooses in a situation where she is
faced with conflicting commitments. That the agent cannot resolve the conflict
without "remainder,,78 to use Williams's phrase, shows that she is committed to both
actions in such a way that she cannot rationally resolve the conflict and is condemned
to moral failure. The moral residue argument thus seems to work on the assumption
that moral residue is appropriate if it occurs after the agent has violated or undermined
a commitment.79 Jt is also known as the "phenomenological argument" as it appeals to
the feelings, emotions and responses the agent experiences after she is faced with
conflicting commitments where one does not necessarily override the other in a
situation where the agent is forced to act on one of the two conilicting
commitments.80
In order to show how the moral residue argument can be seen to support the
reality of genuine moral dilemmas, I discuss moral residue in terms of the
aforementioned conditions that a genuine moral dilemma would have to meet were it
to exist.
The Sadistic Hijackers case
76 McConnell in Mason, 1996, Page 36-37
77 Ibid. 1996.
78 Williams, 1982, Page 179
79 S· Amnott- nnstTong, 1988, Page 44
80 Marcus, 1980, Page 122
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Imagine a case where a mother and her two young daughters are hijacked. The
hijackers steal the vehicle with the mother and children in it and drive it to their
workshop in a township far away. On the drive, the daughters scream in terror and
confusion. This irritates the hijackers immensely. The result is that by the time they
get the car back to their workshop to be stripped of all its expensive parts, they have
had enough of the noise and panic ofthe daughters, and they want the mother to
suffer for failing to quiet them. The hijackers thus give the mother an ultimatum. She
has to choose either action A or action B.
Action A is choosing one daughter (daughter A) to be sold as a child
prostitute. Action B is choosing the other daughter (daughter B) to be sold as a child
prostitute. If the mother refhses to choose a daughter then she will be forced to return
home and both of her daughters will be sold by the hijackers to be child prostitutes. If
she makes a choice between actions A and B, then she will escape unhanned with the
other daughter. No matter what happens the mother will be set free and has the
opportunity to escape the awful situation with only one of her daughters. The mother
thus has the following choices:
i) Choose action Aldaughter A to be sold - protect daughter B - and escape
unscathed with daughter B.
ii) Choose action B/daughter B to be sold - protect daughter A - and escape
unscathed with daughter A.
iii) Choose neither action A nor action B, have both daughter A and daughter
B be sold as child prostitutes, and escape with the fate of both of her
daughters on her conscience.81
In such a case, the mother has two commitments. The first is a commitment to
daughter A. The second is a commitment to daughter B. As a loving mother, she is
committed to caring [or, and protecting her daughters. In the hijacking situation,
however, her ultimatum is such that no matter which alternative she chooses she will
81 I take it as given that option iii) is not a plausible option and - in the context of this example _ the
mother would not consider taking it as I assume that her instinct would be to save at least one child _
and so the mother really does face an ultimatum and an irresolvable conflict of commitments.
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have the fate82 ofone of her daughters on her conscience, and will have undermined
her commitment to either daughter A or daughter B to protect and care for them.
No matter which alternative the mother chooses (action A or action B) she will
experience moral residue. By that, I mean that regardless of which action she chooses
she will experience a sense ofloss for one of her daughter's and their life ahead as a
child prostitute. It is plausible to think that she will experience a sense of
responsibility for ultimately having to choose one of them to be a child prostitute, and
will thus feel a sense of guilt, remorse, or shame, (possibly all three) for her inability
to protect both of her daughters.
As discussed, the moral residue argument works on the assumption that the
emotions an agent like the mother experiences - if appropriate - support the reality of
genuine moral dilemmas as they point to the fact that she faces an irresolvable conflict
of commitments. If we consider the Sadistic Hijackers case, the argument for moral
residue would be as follows:
I) It is appropriate for the agent to experience residue after choosing daughter A
to become a child prostitute.
2) It is appropriate for the agent to experience residue after choosing daughter B
to become a child prostitute.
3) There is no adequate reason for the agent to feel residue after either choice
unless she has violated some commitment (in this case her commitment to
protect daughter A and daughter B respectively).
4) If it is appropriate to experience residue, but there is no adequate reason for
remorse except that a commitment was violated, then a commitment was
violated.
5) Thus, the agent has a commitment not to choose daughter A to be sold as a
child prostitute, and a commibnent not to choose daughter B to be sold as a
child prostitute.
6) The agent cannot prevent the fate as a child prostitute of both daughter A and
daughter B, and yet, she has to choose one of them to be sold as a child
prostitute.
7) Thus, the agent is in a rationally irresolvable commitment conflict: a genuine
moral dilemma.
S2 By this I mean that daughter's fate as a child prostitute.
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The first 3 premises, and premise 6, are dictated to by the situation in which the agent
finds herself. This can be traced back to the situation condition in the first chapter on
the conditions that a genuine moral dilemma would have to meet were it to exist. The
situation condition is such that for a genuine moral dilemma to exist it has to be true
that the agent finds herself in a situation in which she is forced by militating
circumstances and factors outside ofher control to choose between two rationally
irresolvable conflicting commitments.
In the Sadistic Hijackers case, the agent finds herself in a situation that has
been imposed on her by the world in the sense that: I) she does not choose to be
hijacked by sadistic hijackers, ii) she does not choose for her children to make a noise
on the drive, iii) she has no control over her children's noise and panic, and iv) she
similarly has no way ofcontrolling or preventing the hijackers reactions to the noise.
In this way it is the nature of the situation that places the agent in a position where she
has to choose between which of her daughters will be sold, when she is committed to
protecting both of them and would ideally not want either to become child prostitutes
or to be sold as child prostitutes by the sadistic hijackers. It follows that it is not the
result of the agent's incoherent or inconsistent commitments that causes her to be
forced to undermine her commitment to either daughter A or daughter B - it is rather
the situation that forces her to undennine her commitments.83
Proponents of the moral residue argument would argue that the agent in the
Sadistic Hijackers case faces a genuine moral conflict, or a situation that meets the
requirements ofa prohibition dilemma. They would thus argue that it follows that the
situation the agent faces in that case meets the requirements of the situation condition.
That is, the agent faces a situation that has been imposed on her by the world where
she ought not to do either of the acts that she has to choose between, but where she
also has to choose a daughter to be sold if she wants to protect the other daughter.
According to the moral residue argument, if moral residue is appropriate in response
to both action A and action B, then the situation condition is met. I say that because of
McConnell's point that for the moral residue argument to work it has to be true that
the residue experienced in response to either alternative available in a given situation
83 I discuss at a later stage the notion of coherency and the difference between the agent's commitments
being inconsistent (and thus causing her to face a conflict of commitments) and the agent being in a
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to the agent is appropriate. That is to say that if the moral residue is appropriate, then
the situation condition is met (as no other situation could explain the fact that the
agent will necessarily do something morally reprehensible no matter which option she
chooses), and that thus the moral residue argument can support the existence ofa
situation that meets the situation condition.84 The agent's residue is appropriate only if
she does something wrong or undermines a commitment no matter which option she
chooses.85
In this way, proponents attempt to use the moral residue argument to show that
there are some situations where moral residue is justified after either choice that an
agent faces in a given conflict situation. The justification for that residue is the fact
that the agent violates a moral requirement86 or has to undermine her commitments.
Consequently, the moral residue is treated as evidence that the agent is faced with a
situation in which all of her alternatives involved violating a moral requirement or
undermining at least one of her important commitments. According to the moral
residue argument, therefore, all proponents of genuine moral dilemmas need to do is
to prove that the feelings of moral residue are justified (or appropriate) after each
alternative to prove that the agent faced an irresolvable conflict.
For example, consider the agent CZ) whose brother in law is having an affair
with his wife's best friend. Proponents ofgenuine moral dilemmas need only show
that Z is justified in experiencing moral residue in both cases: after lying to her sister
in law when she asks about the affair, and after falling to keep her promise to her
brother in law, to show that she does face an irresolvable conflict - and thus - a
genuine moral dilemma. That is, proponents need only show that Z experiences
moral residue appropriately to support the existence of cases that meet the conditions
of genuine moral dilemmas.
Williams talks in tenns of the agent experiencing moral residue after acting in
cases like the Sadistic Hijackers case, and argues that the agony (the moral residue) is
not so much the result of the agent's doubt that she chose the right option, but rather
that there was no "right" or "best" option available. 87 88 That an agent's desire to act
situation that satisfies the situation condition (that would similarly cause her to face a conflict of
commitments).
84 This is something I go on to prove in my section on integrity.
85 S' Armnott- mstrong, 1988, Page 46
86 Ibid, 1988, Page 44.
87 Williams, 19!12, Page 170
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on the commitment that she eventually could not act on prevails - manifests itself in
the form of moral residue. That is, because the agent still thought that she ought to
act on the commitment that she did not, and because she ideally wanted to act on both
commitments, but could not, she will experience a sense of loss and residue. For
example, the mother's residue in the Sadistic Hijackers case would be because she
feels remorse, or guilt~ because she wrongs the daughter that she eventually chooses
to be sold as a child prostitute. In the example of the unfaithful brother-in-law, Z
would ideally have wanted a situation in which she could tell the truth and keep her
promise, and would have experienced moral residue as a result of the commitment
that she violated.!l9
Marcus argues that genuine moral dilemmas are not resolvable without
residue, and cannot be rationally resolved by appealing to hierarchical systems or
theories that advocate a single, independent source ofvatue above all other values.
90
Her argument thus also suggests that moral residue supports the existence ofcases
that could meet the situation condition. As she argues, in such situations it is absurd
to assume that "we could arrive at a complete set of rules, priorities, or qualifications
that would, in every possible case, unequivocally mandate a single course of
action. ,,91
It follows that the moral residue argument works in such a way that from the
fact that the agent will experience appropriate moral residue whether she does action
A or action B, it follows that she cannot avoid moral residue or doing wrong. This is
because the agent ideally wants to do both action A and action B (or neither action A
nor action B), and yet no matter which option she chooses she is forced to undennine
or violate a commitment. Now that I have discussed how the moral residue argument
is meant to work, I discuss a further aspect of moral residue: the fact that it can also
reflect the agent's cormnitments and values.
As moral residue is appropriate when it is experienced in response to a
situation where an agent undermines or violates her commitments, it follows that it is
evidence for the agent's commitments. Consider again the agent in the Sadistic
gg This also points to a case that meets the situation condition in the sense that if there is no best option
av~ilable, then it would seem to suggest that the agent was in a situation in which she could not prevent
domg wrong regardless of which alternative she chose to act on.
89 In this way the moral residue argument focuses on the commitment that the agent violated, and the
Impact of that on her.
90 Marcus, 1980, Page 124
91 Marcus, Page 124
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Hijackers case: her moral residue reflects her commitment to loving and wanting to
protect her daughters. This links to the idea that emotions can be appropriate: they can
fit an agent's decisions and actions appropriately.92 Whether an agent experiences
moral residue or not, is determined by what she is committed to and by how she acts
when faced with a conflict between her commitments.
It can also be argued that moral residue is a reassuring sign that the agent took
her commitments seriously i.e. that she was really committed to them93 . For example,
in the Sadistic Hijackers case, it would be more disturbing had the mother chosen a
daughter to be shot and not experienced feelings of remorse, guilt, and shame. If the
mother had made her decision happily, or indifferently, we would deem her a bad
mother, and a questionable moral agent who was not committed to protecting her
daughters. We can thus understand Williams' notion that emotions reflect on
whether an agent is an "admirable human being or not,,,94 or whether she is a "decent
human being".95 We could furthermore assume that the mother did not love her
daughters, nor did she care for their safety. It therefore seems that "at least some
remorse is appropriate,,96 in response to both of the mother's alternatives - and that
the remorse is evidence that she really was committed to preventing both of her
daughters from being sold as child prostitutes.
In cases ofappropriate moral residue that seem to meet the sufficient
conditions of a genuine moral dilemma, it is not only a question of what can be done,
but of what fails to be done.97 Such situations - if they exist - involve what it is in the
agent's power to do, and what she will inevitably fail to do. The agent is thus damned
no matter how she eventually chooses to act.98 If the agent does not experience
residue, it suggests that the course ofaction she eventually chose eliminated the
conflict. Ifthat were the case, then the agent would not have experienced a situation
that could meet the conditions of a genuine moral dilemma, as one of her conflicting
commitments overrode the other.
92 A concept I pay more attention to in my discussions concerning remorse
~ . "
Williams, 1982, Page 175
94 Ib"dI " 1982, Page 166
95 Ibid. 1982, Page 173
% Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 45
97 Ibid" 1988, Page 45
98 Marcus, 1980, Page 127
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According to proponents of the moral residue argument, however, "to insist
that there is in every case a solution without residue is false to the moral facts,,99 This
is because they argue that in cases where moral residue is appropriate in response to
both of the agent's alternatives, it can support the existence of genuine moral
dilemmas.
Objections to the Moral Residue argument
In this section I discuss the two arguably most important objections to the moral
residue argument. The first is that the moral residue argument begs the question by
assuming the agent who experiences moral residue faced a genuine conflict of
commitments that could not rationally be resolved. The second is the claim that the
notion of experiencing moral residue "appropriately" does no useful work, as there
are cases where it is not inappropriate for the agent to experience moral residue
although she has done nothing wrong. After examining the objections, I discuss how
these opponents understand the notion ofappropriate moral residue. I argue that both
objections seem to turn on particular understandings of appropriateness.
The first objection is based on the claim that appealing to the fact that an
agent experiences appropriate moral residue in response to an apparent dilemma - in
order to show that she could not but undermine one of her commitments - presupposes
that she could not but undermine one of her commitments. It thus presupposes that
she faced a genuine dilemma. This presupposition is required, the objection runs, for
proponents to make sense of the moral residue being appropriate.
According to the first objection, proponents of genuine moral dilemmas are
begging the question that, for example, the remorse the agent experiences is not
inappropriate. 100 That is, proponents are presupposing that the agent faces a genuine
conflict of commitments where the conflict cannot rationally be resolved, and where
she is forced to do something wrong. It is however, the very question of whether the
agent does something wrong and whether her moral residue actually is appropriate
that is in question in determining whether the moral residue argument works.
Claiming that the moral residue is appropriate 101 presupposes that the commitment
99 Marcus, 1980, Page 132
100 S·mnott-Arrnstrong, 1988, Page 47
101 A key premise in the moral residue argument.
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acted on does not override the commitment not acted on. That is, it presupposes an
irresolvable conflict of commitments (and thus, a situation that could meet the
conditions of a genuine moral dilenuna).
For example, in the Sadistic Hijackers case the agent would have felt
remorse, guilt, or shame, because she judged herself as having done something wrong.
The question is thus whether emotions ofmoral residue are appropriate in the sense
that they reflect the fact that the agent was in a genuine moral dilemma that met the
conditions of irresolvable conflict, loss, and a situation in which she could not but
undennine one of her conunitments and face inevitable wrongdoing. It remains,
however, that the moral residue argument rests on the assumption that the emotions
the agent experiences are appropriate and that they thus support the existence of
genuine moral dilemmas. 102 It is furthennore based on the assumption that the agent
violated or undermined a commitment and would no matter which option she chose to
act on. Again, however, that is the very thing in question. As Sinnott-Armstrong says,
"since the argwnent from remorse is supposed to show that there are conflicting moral
requirements, the argument begs the questton."I03
The idea at work here is that feelings like guilt, shame, and remorse are
emotions of negative self-assessment that are experienced appropriately when the
agent has violated a commitment or done something wrong. 104 McConnell claims that
the moral residue argument works on the assumption that agents typically respond to
situations of irresolvable conflict with moral residue - an assumption that begs the
question. McConnnell thinks that as the emotions of moral residue are all negative
emotions of self-assessment, they automatically contain a negative value judgement
that the agent actually has done something wrong, L05 and yet, that is the very thing
that the moral residue argument needs to prove: the fact that the agent could not avoid
doing wrong no matter which option she chose to act on. It follows that the emotions
ofmoral residue cannot be used to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.
All that the presence of such emotions indicate, is that the agent has judged herself as
having done something wrong, or that she believes that she has done something
wrong. I06 In so doing, McConnell contrasts regret lO7 and remorse, and argues that
102 S' Amnott- rmstrong, 1988, Page 47
103 Ibid. 1988
104 Ibid. 1988, Page 50
!O5 McConnell in Mason, 1996, Page 39
106 Ibid. 1996, Page 38
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while an agent can experience the fonner in response to something that she had
nothing to do with - or that she did not cause - by feeling an emotion like remorse, the
agent presupposes that she, herself, has done something wrong.
McConneU is objecting to the problematic nature of moral residue itself.
That is, he is objecting to the fact that because moral residue relies on emotions that
necessarily entail the judgment that the agent has done something wrong, it cannot but
presuppose that if the agent experiences moral residue in response to both alternatives
in a given situation, then situations that seem to meet the sufficient conditions of
genuine moral dilemmas do exist. The efficacy of the moral residue argument thus
depends on the assumption that there is a real irresolvable conflict of commitments.
As McConnell argues, however, the presence of moral residue only shows that the
agent has judged herself as having done something wrong, and is not evidence that the
agent really did do something wrong or that she would necessarily have felt moral
residue appropriately in response to both alternatives. McConneU thus thinks that the
appeal to moral residue "does not establish the reality or the possibility of moral
dilemmas.,,108
Greenspan raises a similar objection as she recognises that the emotions of
moral residue like remorse, guilt, and shame, "involve negative evaluations focussed
more or less explicitly on the self,,109 Greenspan suggests that when an agent
experiences guilt, remorse, or shame, she is judging herself as having done something
wrong - as such emotions require the judgement that she actually is guilty. 110 This
links into the second objection, as, not only do the emotions appealed to in the moral
residue argument presuppose that the agent has done wrong - they also work on the
assumption that such emotions are appropriate and are evidence that the agent faced
an irresolvable conflict of commitments: a genuine moral dilemma. It remains,
however, that an agent can experience emotions of moral residue appropriately in
response to situations where she did not do wrong.
107 Despite the contrast that he makes, regret is not an emotion of moral residue, as the agent does Dot
have to be causally connected to the act to experience regret. That is, she can experience regret for
things that she herself did not do. For example, an agent can regret the death of her friend's husband.
In this way regret is not an emotion of moral residue. I say that because it is not a negati ve emotion of
self-assessment, as the agent has done nothing wrong in cases where she experiences regret, and thus
she cannot assess herself as having undermined a commitment or done something wrong
108 . .
McConneJl in Mason, 1996, Page 38
109 Greenspan, 1995, Page 135
110 Ibid. 1995, Page 151
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The second objection is thus that the existence ofappropriate moral residue
can neither be used as evidence that genuine moral dilemmas exist, nor can it be used
to show that there are situations where the agent faces inevitable wrongdoing.
Greenspan's point is that as it is not inappropriate to experience moral residue even in
cases where the agent has done nothing wrong, there is no necessary connection
between negative self-assessment and actual wrongdoing. That is, appropriateness
has nothing to do with moral responsibility, and thus even if proponents are able to
show that an agent's moral residue is appropriate, it cannot be used as evidence that
the agent in question necessarily did anything wrong. I I I Consequently, according to
the second objection, the notion ofappropriate moral residue is insignificant and
cannot support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.
Greenspan defends what she refers to as a "nonjudgementalist view of guilt"
as an agent can arguably feel subjectively guilty, even when she is aware that she is
not necessarily morally responsible. Il2 In this way Greenspan's account does not
depend on the assumption that emotions involve evaluative beliefs, because although
an emotion like guilt involves the agent's assessment of herself as morally
responsible, it need not always involve the corresponding belief that she actually is
morally responsible. Consequently, Greenspan allows for cases where the agent is
guilty, but not morally blameworthy, 113 and she thus objects to the moral residue
argument on the basis that it begs the question by assuming that to feel guilty means
that the agent actually is guilty. Such reasoning begs the question on the basis that
there are cases of guilt without fault. \14
Opponents appealing to the second objection can argue that the moral
residue argument does not work because it relies on the fact that if an agent
experiences appropriate moral residue in response to both alternatives in a given
situation, then she will necessarily have to do something wrong and undennine her
commitments. That an agent can experience moral residue appropriately in instances
where she has done nothing wrong, undennines the moral residue argument, because
it means that the appeal to appropriate moral residue cannot show that the agent will
necessariJy have to do something wrong, or that she necessarily faces a genuine moral
dilemma.
III McConnell in Mason. 1996, Page 38
[12 .
Ibid., 1995, Page 151
113 Ib"dI . 1995, Page 165
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According to the second objection, opponents could argue that, for example,
an agent committed to conservation can experience guilt, remorse, and shame for
accidentally standing on a lame field mouse that she did not see when she was
walking through thick bush. In such a case opponents would argue that although her
moral residue is appropriate, the agent has done nothing wrong in the sense that she is
not morally blameworthy. It follows that the emotions appealed to by proponents of
genuine moral dilemmas in the moral residue argument are appropriate in cases where
the agent does not face a genuine moral dilemma. lIS The implication is that the moral
residue argument fails and cannot support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.
It remains, however, that the moral residue argument relies on the assumption
that emotions like guilt, shame, and remorse are appropriate and point to the fact that
the agent was in a situation in which she was forced to undermined her commitments
and that necessitated wrongdoing. Nonetheless, both Greenspan and McConnell
make reference to cases where the agent experiences moral residueI 16 in response to
cases where she has done nothing wrong and yet her moral residue appears to be both
warranted and appropriate. According to the second objection, that an agent is
causally responsible is not evidence that she is morally responsible. 117 Consequently,
moral residue is not evidence for the existence ofgenuine moral dilemmas or
situations in which the agent could not but have done something wrong.
For example, imagine that the agent is in her car, and is about to reverse. In
the car parked beside her is a mother and her child. The child is holding a handful of
marbles, and the mother is busy nattering on her telephone - completely oblivious of
the neighbouring cars and her son in relation to them. The woman reversing checks all
around before she reverses, is a competent driver, and is aware of the woman and her
son. However, just as the agent finishes checking her surroundings, the child drops
his favourite marble and runs behind the agent's car as she reverses. The agent runs
over the child and kills him in front of his mother.
In this case, although the agent is causally responsible in the sense that she
ran over the child, she is - according to the second objection - not morally
responsible in the sense that she checked before reversing and could not have
accounted for the child dropping his favourite marble and running behind her car at
114 Ibid. 1995, Page 154
115 S·mnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 48
116 Greenspan, 1995, Page 154
46
the last minute. It remains, however, that her awareness of the fact that she did not
mean to run the child over and did check thoroughly before reversing would not
eradicate her feelings of moral residue. I 18 No matter how much she is able to reason
that she has done nothing wrong in the sense that she was not morally responsible,
and that - for instance - the mother was as much to blame for not watching the boy or
holding his hand, it remains that she was driving and she ran him over.
Consequently, the agent is still likely to experience guilt for having run the
child over, despite her recognition that it was not strictly her fault. Furthermore, the
agent is likely to mull over the event and wonder how things could have been
different had she checked her mirrors again, or paid more attention to the fact that the
mother was not concentrating on her child and that he was likely to run out at the last
minute. The agent would thus - like the agent in the Sadistic Hijackers case - be
plagued with remorse and guilt, and would in some sense be unable to live with
herself.119 It remains, however, that her apparently appropriate moral residue does not
point to her having done anything wrong. For appropriate moral residue to support
the existence of genuine moral dilemmas there must be a necessary connection
between appropriate moral residue and doing wrong.
McConnell furthermore argues that it is hard for an agent to be able to be
objective in such a case. Although the agent may reason that she was not responsible,
that she could not have foreseen the accident, and although she took all the
precautions she could, it remains that it is natural and appropriate for her to wonder if
things could have been different, and to experience guilt, remorse, and shame in
response for her actions. 120 As McConnell says, "human beings are not so fine tuned
emotionally that when they have been causally responsible for hann, they can easily
turn remorse on or off depending on their degree of moral responsibility.,,121 He thus
thinks that because there are cases where an agent's remorse is not inappropriate even
though we think that she is not warranted in believing that she has done something
wrong (like the agent who ran over the little boy), it shows that the moral residue
argument is flawed. It follows that if the moral residue argument cannot serve as
117 McCOIUlell in Mason, 1996, Page 38
118 And, ifit did, we may find her a morally reprehensible agent as we would the mother in the Sadistic
Hijackers case had she reacted indifferently or happily to choosing one of her daughters to be sold as a
child prostitute.
119 By that I mean that she would be guilt-stricken and would despair at the fact that she is not the type
of person that runs over a child or kills children.
120 McConnelJ in Mason, 1996, Page 39
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evidence that the agent has done something wrong, then it cannot support the reality
of situations where the agent was condemned to moral failure: situations that seem to
meet the requirements of genuine moral dilemmas.
Now that I have explained how the two main objections to the moral residue
argument work, I pay some attention to how opponents understand the notion of
experiencing moral residue 'appropriately'. The understanding of what it means to
experience moral residue appropriately is central to the moral residue argument. It is
also central to the efficacy of the previously discussed objections to it.
Opponents of genuine moral dilemmas seem to understand proponents as
arguing that an agent can only experience moral residue appropriately if she has done
something wrong. The two objections discussed, however, deny that this is the case.
McConnell suggests that the presence of negative emotions of self-assessment like
shame, guilt, or remorse, are insufficient to establish that the agent has done anything
wrong. He claims that for proponents to maintain that moral residue is appropriate
and does prove that the agent has done something wrong, they have to asswne that the
agent faced a genuine moral dilemmala rationally irresolvable conflict of
commitments and inevitable wrongdoing. The first objection thus relies on a
conception ofappropriateness that is such that an agent's moral residue is appropriate
iff she faced a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments.
Greenspan, however, argues that it is appropriate for an agent to experience
moral residue even in cases where she has done nothing wrong in the sense that she is
not morally responsible. 122 The implication is that in cases where the agent did
something morally reprehensible by accident or out of ignorance, she cannot be said
to experience moral residue appropriately. That is, although she will have done
something she ought not to have, she cannot be said to have done anything wrong, as
cases like that in which she ran over the child are accidental and she cannot be said to
be morally blameworthy. The second objection thus denies the link between
experiencing appropriate moral residue and doing wrong. The implication of the
objection is that while appropriate moral residue is a broad term and need not entail
doing wrong, doing wrong is a narrow term confined to cases where the agent is
morally blameworthy.
121 Ibid. 1996, Page 39
122 L'k th .l"e e agent who ran over the little boy who chased after his favourite marble.
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Proponents, however, argue that moral residue is inappropriate in cases
where one commitment overrode the other, or where the agent believed that she acted
for the best. WilJiams argues that genuine moral conflicts are not "soluble without
remainder,,,123 and seems to base his argument on the understanding that in a genuine
moral conflict the agent will necessarily have to undennine one of her commitments
and will thus inevitably face moral failure. For example, proponents would argue that
the agent in the Sadistic Hijackers case would experience appropriate moral residue
for choosing one of her daughters to be sold as a child prostitute. Proponents thus
seem to have a different understanding of what constitutes appropriate moral residue
than opponents do.
While opponents like McConnell are of the opinion that the agent has done
nothing wrong if she acts out of ignorance or by accident, proponents make no such
distinction between whether the agent is causally or morally responsible. Rather,
proponents seem to work on the understanding that an agent can only experience
moral residue and negative feelings of self-assessment if she is aware that she has
done something wrong or violated a commitment. The understanding is that the agent
can only experience moral residue appropriately if she is conscious ofa conflict
between what she ought to do and what she did so, and ifhow she eventually acted
opposed what she ought to do or how she would ideally have wanted to act.
Consequently, proponents would interpret the case of the woman who
accidentally ran over the little boy differently to how opponents did. That is,
proponents would argue that the agent experiences moral residue appropriately
because she had done something wrong: something that conflicted with what she
thought she ought to have done. 124 It thus seems that for the moral residue argument
to withstand the objections, it is necessary to find an independent way ofdetermining
that when an agent experiences moral residue appropriately, it is because she actuaUy
has done something wrong.
Now that I have discussed what the moral residue argument is, and how it
works, and have discussed the emotions involved in the moral residue argument and
the objections levelled against it, I go on to discuss Lynn McFall's conception of
integrity. In so doing I intend to rework the moral residue argument in terms of
P3 W'll'- I lams, 1982, Page 179
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integrity and, by this means, to show the merits of the moral residue argument despite
the aforementioned objections. Integrity provides a way of understanding the moral
residue argument that is better than the other notions of appropriate moral residue and
in a way that overcomes the objections.
124 Th . h .
at 1S, ow she acted by runrung the boy over would have conflicted with how she ideallv ,,"'ould




According to Sinnott-Annstrong, in order to avoid the objections levelled against the
moral residue argument it is necessary to give an independent argument that the moral
residue an agent experiences is not inappropriate. 125 In this section I defend the
existence ofmoral dilemmas by using Lynn McFall's conception of integrity as an
independent way of showing how the moral residue argument can work. By
interpreting the notion ofappropriate moral residue in tenns of integrity, I address the
aforementioned objections that the moral residue argument begs the question, and that
moral residue can be felt appropriately in situations where the agent did not face
inevitable wrongdoing.
In order to do this I go on to use two case shldies to show that there are
instances where an agent experiences appropriate moral residue in response to both
alternatives in a given situation, and that can be used as evidence that there are cases
where the situation, conflict, and loss conditions can be met. These are cases extracted
from William Styron's Sophie 's Choice, and Euripides' lphigenia at Aulis.
In what follows I discuss what integrity is in tenns of McFall's conception of
the necessary and sufficient conditions of integrity. In so doing I discuss the different
types ofcommitments that an agent has. I also discuss how they can determine
whether she is an admirable agent or not, and how - even when coherent -
commitments can conflict in a way that compromises the agent's integrity and can
point to the reality of situations that meet the conditions ofa genuine moral dilemma.
What is Integrity?
A common, and, on the face of it, plausible view of integrity is that it involves being
true to one's personal commitments. An agent has integrity if she remains true to the
principles and commitments that she holds. Consider the example of the agent, Z,
whose brother-in-law is having an affair. Z is committed to keeping the promise that
she made to her brother-in-law, and to telling the truth to his desperate wife. Z will
thus have integrity if she remains true to those commitments and does not undennine
or ignore them - even in cases where it may be difficult to do so. Integrity thus
125 S·mnott-Armstrong, 1988, Page 47
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involves responsibility, as the agent has to uphold the commitments to which she
chooses to commit herself
In her paper, Integrity, McFall discusses what she takes integrity to be. Her
conception can be divided into the following necessary conditions:
l) That the agent is committed to certain principles
2) That the commitments are such that they can conflict with her desires,126
3) That she upholds those principles in the face of temptation or challenge,127
4) That (given l), 2), and 3» she faces the possibility oflosing her integrity by
undennining her commitments, and
5) That she has an authentic relation to her principles
All the necessary conditions of integrity are closely linked, and although each
condition is necessary, the five conditions together are sufficient for integrity.
The first condition (that a person of integrity must be committed to certain
principles) includes a sub-condition that places constraints on the content of the
agent's commitments. It also stipulates that only identity-conferring commitments are
the type ofcommitments that apply to integrity. The fifth condition similarly has a
sub-condition: the condition that the agent's commitments have to be coherent for it
to count as integrity. Although 1discuss the sub-conditions in more detail in due
course, I now use an example to illustrate how the basic necessary conditions work
and what a person of integrity would be like.
Consider the hypothetical case of Bunny Hugger Bob. Bob meets the first
condition of integrity because he is committed to animal anti-cruelty and thus works
for the RSPCA. 128 Although Bob was a qualified lawyer, he was so disturbed by the
amount ofanimal cruelty in the world that he decided not to follow his career as a
lawyer and decided to commit himself to preventing cruelty to animals. His decision
made his fiiends and family both confused and disparaging, as (although they cared
for animals and had the odd pet) they neither shared nor understood Bob's active
commitment to animal anti-cruelty.
Bob's commitment to animal anti-cruelty meets the second necessary
condition as it has the potential to conflict with his desires. 1say that because the
chances are high that Bob may desire to be in a job where he works a predictable
126 McFalJ, 1987, Page 9-10
127 Ibid. 1987, Page 9
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eight-hour day. He may also desire to escape having to deal with the emotional stress
of, say, rescuing and witnessing suffering animals on a daily basis. Bob may also
desire to make more money than he does at the RSPCA and may - at times - secretly
resent his commitment to animal anti-cruelty and his work at the RSPCA, as he could
be doing something more lucrative.
To have integrity, Bob would have to meet the third necessary condition and
uphold his commitment in the face of temptation I29 or challenge. Bob would thus
have to uphold his commitment although he may be at the RSPCA on a sweltering
day cleaning out cat litter and fur balls, and may want to be working in a plush office
with air conditioner. He would similarly have to uphold his commitment to animal
anti-cmelty ifhe were challenged by, say, an especially vicious dog that savaged his
hand. 130
An example that could be considered both a temptation and a challenge would
be if Bob were offered a high-paid job at a prestigious law firm. In such a case Bob
would be tempted to take the job and it would be a challenge for him to stick to his
commitment at the RSPCA, because the prospective job would be more pleasurable
and more financially rewarding. 131
That Bob is committed to something that can conflict with his desires, and
that he has to work to uphold his commitment, means that he meets the fourth
condition of integrity: he faces Joss. This is because in taking the job, or kicking the
scared dog that savaged his hand, Bob would have suffered from some type of
weakness ofwill,132 as he would have undermined his commitment and compromised
his integrity. 133 If Bob undermined bis commitment to animal anti-cruelty by beating
the dog or accepting the job offer at the law firm, he would lose a part ofhimself134 in
128 That's not to say that animal anti-cruelty is the only thing that Bob is committed to, it is just to say
that amongst the things that Bob is committed to, one of them is animal anti-cruelty.
129 Like his desire to go to a friend's or read a book during his free time.
130 In such a case Bob may want to beat the dog or kick the dog - even though Bob may realise that the
dog is scared and has been made so vicious because his previous owners beat him repeatedly. If Bob
did beat or kick the dog, then he would undermine his commitment to animal anti-cruelty.
131 In the likelihood that Bob accepted the job offer, he would gain the approval of his fTiends and
family, make more money, and have a far more comfortable job in the sense that he would not have to
?~ menial work or have the emotional turmoil of seeing so many desperate animals.
.' McFall, 1987, page 7
133 Bob would suffer weakness of will because he undermined or violated his commitment to animal
anti-cruelty by taking the job or kicking the dog and was thus too weak to uphold his commitment. He
may also suffer from self-deception ifhe failed to uphold his commitment and did not admit that he
had experienced weakness of will.
134 I discuss the notion of losing a part of himself in terms of identity-conferring commitments in due
course.
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that he would no longer be Bunny Hugger Bob. He would no longer be the man
committed to animal anti-cruelty above other things.
The example also illustrates the sub-condition of the first necessary condition
of integrity: that the agent has to have important, identity-conferring commitments for
it to count as integrity. As seen in the case of Bob, an agent with integrity cannot be
committed to things like pleasure, approval, or wealth. The content of those
commitments is such that they will not satisfy the third and fourth necessary
conditions,135 as such commitments would not conflict with the types of challenges
and temptations that a reasonable person would face. 136 By this I mean that being
committed to things like wealth, or pleasure, means that an agent will not have to
uphold her commitments. This is because wealth, pleasure, desires, and approval, are
the very things that tempt the agent to undermine or violate her commitments. To the
same extent, the nature of integrity is that it precludes "expediency, artificiality, or
shallowness of any kind,,,137 and thus precludes things like commitments to pleasure,
wealth, etc.
Furthermore, "personal integrity requires identity-conferring
commitments.,,138 McFall distinguishes between defeasible commitments and
identity-conferring commitments. In brief, defeasible commitments are important,
personal commitments that can be sacrificed without remorse, and can be overridden
by other important, unconditional commitments. l39 Bob's professional success as a
lawyer in a well-paid prestigious job would be an example ofa defeasible
commitment for him. 14o
Identity-conferring commitments, however, are unconditional commitments,
are fundamental to the agent as they reflect what she takes to be the most important
things in her life, and thus determine her moral identity to a large extent. 141 This is
because identity-conferring commitments are "conditions ofcontinuing as
ourselves.,,142 ldentity-conferring commitments are such that if the agent undermines
135 The conditions that Bob's commitments must have the potential to conflict with his desires, and
must be such that Bob faces the possibility of loss.
136 McFall, 1987, Page II
137 Ibid. 1987, Page 11
138 Ibid. 1987, Page 16
IWIb"d. I" 1987, Page 12
140 I only mention defeasible commitments as a contrast to identity-conferring commitments, as the
latter are crucial to integrity, and apply to the moral residue argument, whereas defeasible
commitments are not.
141
McFall, 1987, Page 13
142 McFall, 1987, Page 12
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them then she cannot "live" with herself in the sense that she is no longer the person
that she thought she was, or that she ideally wants to be. For example, Bob could not
live with himselfifhe ever ran over a dog. To the same extent, if Bob ever kicked a
cat in a fit of rage and irritation on a sweltering day spent cleaning out cat litter and
fur balls, he would similarly be unable to live with himself once he realised what he
had done and saw the hurt, stricken cat.
Identity-conferring commitments are thus also what McFall refers to as "core"
commitments. They detennine what sort of person an agent is, and they cannot be
"justified by reference to other values, because they are the most fundamental
commitments we have; they determine what, for us, is to count as a reason.,,143 That
an agent with integrity holds important, identity-conferring commitments makes the
fourth necessary condition of integrity possible, as, "where there is no possibility of
loss, integrity cannot exist." 144 This is because only important, unconditional
commitments with the potential to conflict with the agent's desires make it possible
that an agent could (like Bob when he kicks the cat or accepts the prestigious job at
the law finn) lose a part of himself by undennining his commitments.
Given McFall's understanding of integrity, it follows that all morality is
essentially a personal morality. 145 146 This brings us to the fifth condition - that for it
to count as integrity, the agent has to have an authentic relation to the principles to
which she commits herself By that I mean that the agent has to i) recognise those
commitments as important and valuable, ii) must want to uphold those commitments
because she recognises them as important and valuable, and iii) her commitments
must be coherent. 147
To return to Bob, he could be said to have an authentic relation to his
principles in the likelihood that he would have been appalled by cruelty to animals,
and recognised that committing himself to animal anti-cruelty was important to him
and valuable to the animals. Furthermore, that Bob wanted to help at the RSPCA and
143 Ibid. 1987, Page 13
144 Ibid. 1987, Page 9
145 Ibid. 1987, Page 20
146 By saying that all morality is a personal morality I am not prejudging whether morality is objective
or not. Ail I am claiming is that regardless of whether morality is objective, it is personal in the sense
that the agent has to ascribe to principles of morality and make them her own. In this wav whether
there is an objective moral standard that dictates that say, "killing is wrong", or whether the agent just
chooses to believe that "killing is wrong", does not detract from the fact that the conception that
something like "killing is wrong" has to belong to the agent and is a personal morality for her in the
sense that she believes it, deems it important, and commits herself to refraining from killing.
147 I discuss the notion of coherence in due course.
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help animals, and that he sacrificed his profession as a lawyer in order to commit
himseifto animal anti-cruelty and the RSPCA, similarly means that he would have
met the fifth necessary condition of integrity. For an agent to have integrity she must
thus make her commitments and principles - conventional or otherwise - her own. 148
This brings us to the sub-condition of the fifth necessary condition of integrity
- the agent's commitments have to be coherent. This sub-condition is possibly the
most important condition for my discussions on the efficacy of the moral residue
argument. 149 For an agent's commitments to be coherent, it has to be the case that her
principles and her commitments are consistent. ISO There also has to be coherence
between her commitments and her actions, so that she upholds her commitments even
when she is tempted to undermine or ignore them. She must also do the right things
for the right reasons. Bob's commitments would be coherent, as his commitment to
the principle of animal anti-cruelty is consistent with his commitment to working at
the RSPCA. Bob's actions would be consistent with his principles and would reflect
his commitment to animal anti-cruelty, as he sacrificed his job as a lawyer, helps the
animals, rescues them from abusive homes, and cleans out their cages etc. Bob
similarly does the right things for the right reasons, as he helps animals because he
thinks that cruelty to animals is abhorrent and thinks that it is important and valuable
to help hurt, abused animals. In this way, Bob would have integrity and coherence as
long as he upholds his commitments and does not undermine them in the face of
challenge or temptation.
The notion ofcoherence is crucial in determining whether or not the moral
residue argument can work. I say that because, if the agent's commitments are
incoherent, then it follows that her experience of moral residue cannot be used as
evidence to support the existence ofgenuine moral dilemmas. If her commitments are
incoherent, then it means that she committed herself to principles that will necessarily
conflict. It follows that in the likelihood that she is faced with a rationally
irresolvable conflict of commitments, it will be her own fault. Thus, it cannot be used
as evidence that she is in a world-imposed situation that necessitates wrongdoing (and
thus supports the existence of genuine moral dilemmas). If the agent's moral residue
does not point to a world-imposed situation that meets the requirements of the
148 McFalJ 1987 P 6, , age
149 I discuss why after I have given an account of coherence.
IjO McFall 1987 P 7, ,age
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situation condition, then her experience of appropriate moral residue cannot be used
to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.
Ifwe modifY the example of Bob, this can be made clearer. Consider a case
where Modified Bob commits himself to animal anti-cruelty and working for the
RSPCA, and similarly commits himself to a religious group. The religious group
advocates that at each religious festival or holiday, one of the members ofthe
congregation will be chosen to sacrifice a goat to appease their God. Imagine that
Modified Bob is chosen at the religious festival to be the honoured member to
sacrifice the goat. In that case, Modified Bob faces an apparently irresolvable conilict
of commitments. On the one hand, Modified Bob is committed to animal anti-cruelty;
on the other hand, Modified Bob is committed to the religion. Just as part of
Modified Bob's commitment to animal anti-cruelty involves his work at the RSPCA,
so part of his commitment to the religion involves the possibility of having to sacrifice
a goat at festivals.
Both commitments are identity-conferring commitments for Modified Bob.
That Modified Bob would experience moral residue in response to both alternatives,
however, cannot be used to support the existence of a genuine moral dilemma. This is
because the fact that Modified Bob would have done wrong no matter which option
he chosel 51 does not support the existence ofa situation that meets the requirements of
the situation condition. This is because the conflict Modified Bob faces and the fact
that he will inevitably do wrong, is his fault, and not something caused by the
situation in which he finds himself: a situation imposed on him by the world. It is his
fault, because he committed himself to two principles that were incoherent.
Thus, for integrity to work as an independent way of discerning whether an
agent's moral residue is appropriate or not, it is necessary that the agent's
commitments are coherent. This brings us to a different interpretation of
appropriateness: an agent can be said to experience appropriate moral residue ifher
commitments are coherent and yet she still compromises her integrity no matter which
option she chooses. The implication being that an agent who compromises her
integrity is doing something wrong.
151 That is. sacrificing the goat (an option that would have undermined his commitment to animal anti-
cruelty) or refusing to sacrifice the goat (an option that would have undermined his commitment to the
religion).
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Such an interpretation ofappropriateness can avoid the objections levelled
against the moral residue argument It cannot be said to beg the question, and assume
that an agent is doing wrong just because she experiences negative emotions of self-
assessment or moral residue.
To the same extent, if we interpret appropriate moral residue in terms of
integrity, then opponents ofgenuine moral dilemmas cannot argue that the moral
residue argument is flawed because there are cases where an agent experiences
appropriate moral residuel52 and yet, has done nothing wrong. If appropriate moral
residue is a question of integrity, then Greenspan's understanding ofdoing something
wrong as being morally responsible no longer holds.
By understanding appropriate moral residue in terms of integrity, the notion of
doing wrong is less narrow. This is because - in terms of integrity - doing wrong is a
question of the agent undermining or violating her identity-conferring commitments.
In this way, if Bob accidentally ran over a dogl53 and experienced remorse, guilt, or
shame, those emotions would be appropriate as Bob would have done something
wrong - he would have undermined his commitment to animal anti-cruelty.
I now go on to discuss my two case studies in terms of integrity. In so doing I
use the notion ofappropriate moral residue in terms of integrity to show how the
moral residue argument can work to prove the existence of situations that meet the
conditions of a genuine moral dilemma.
152 An example would be the agent who ran over the little boy who dropped his favourite marble in the
parking lot. Although her residue is appropriate, she did not do anything wrong.
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Chapter 4
Defendine: the moral residue are:ument: case studies - Soohie's Choice and
Iphigenia at Aulis
In this chapter, I make my case that the moral residue argument can be salvaged. In
so doing I examine two cases, two protagonists: Sophie and Agamenmon. I then argue
that the moral residue argument can be used to show the existence of a genuine moral
dilemma in each case. I start with a brief outline of the cases, and then discuss what
moves I make in the rest of the paper.
In William Styron's Sophie 's Choice, we witness Sophie, a Polish woman
who survives the Nazi concentration camps. On her arrival at Auschwitz, the dmnk,
sadistic German Dr. Jemand von Niemand forces Sophie to choose between the lives
of her two children - lan and Eva. She has to choose which child will stand a chance
of survival and go with her into the concentration camp, and which child will be killed
in the gas chamber straight away. 154 She is given this ultimatum and pressurised to
make a fast decision or else face losing them both to the gas chamber.
In Euripides' lphigenia at Aulis, we witness Agamemnon., both a loving
father and husband, and mler and leader in the war against Troy. The seer Kalchas
tells Agamernnon that the winds will blow and his anny will sail to defeat Troy if
Agamernnon sacrifices Iphigenia, his daughter. 155 Agamernnon thus has to choose
between sacrificing his daughter to appease the Gods and enable his restless troops to
sail to war, and saving her and thus losing the chance for his troops to sail to war.
In order to illustrate the efficacy of the moral residue argument, I first
establish that there is sufficient evidence in both Sophie 's Choice and lphigenia at
Aulis to support the fact that both Sophie and Agamernnon experience moral residue.
Thereafter, I discern whether the moral residue that both Sophie and Agamernnon
experience after making their respective choices, is appropriate. I thus argue that both
Sophie and Agamemnon compromise their integrity no matter which alternative they
choose to act on. By that I mean that regardless ofwhich alternative they I56 both
:~: For example, like the aforementioned agent who accidentally ran over the little boy.
Styron, 2000, Page 594
155 BlondeJl, ]999, Page 331
156 In this section the use of "they" or "their" will refer to Sophie and Agamemnon.
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choose to act on, they will do something wrong in the sense that in acting they will
violate, compromise, or undermine their integrity.
I then argue that the presence ofappropriate moral residue understood in
terms of integrity shows that the conflict, loss, and situation conditions for the
existence of a genuine moral dilemma can be satisfied in both Sophie and
Agamemnon's cases. Moreover, in showing how my account overcomes the
objections to the moral residue argwnent, I argue that this understanding of
appropriate moral residue in terms of integrity is a significant advance on the
conceptions ofappropriate moral residue assumed in the objections.
Evidence of Sophie's moral residue
Throughout the novel, evidence of Sophie's moral residue is seen in her reticence to
disclose all the details of her experiences at Auschwitz and Birkenau. From early on
in the book the reader is made aware that although Sophie has told her boyfriend
Nathan and friend Stingo the outline of her experiences in the concentration camps, a
sense remains that she leaves certain crucial details out - namely, her horrifYing
choice. 157 That she leaves such information out is evidence of her moral residue: the
shame and guilt that she experiences.
I say that because shame and guilt are negative emotions of self-assessment
and Sophie's reticence to be completely honest shows that she blames and hates
herself for choosing her daughter Eva to go to the gas chambers. It is plausible to say
that Sophie experiences guilt and anger towards herself for doing wrong to Eva, and
she feels shame because in choosing Eva to be gassed she directly betrays her love for
her daughter in a way she deems morally abhorrent. Sophie's moral residue can thus
be seen as the result of her internal observer judging what she did as wrong. 158 It
seems that her reluctance to disclose her choice shows her fear that others will judge
her in the same way.
The reader gleans an understanding of Sophie's moral residue through Stingo,
the narrator, who provides an insight into her thoughts and feelings. For example,
when wondering why Sophie gives an incomplete version of her experiences in the
concentration camps, he remarks
157
Styron, 2000, Pagel76
158 I discuss whether what Sophie did was actually wrong or not at a later stage.
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"The word 'guilt,' I noticed that summer, was often dominant in her vocabulary,
and it is now clear to me that a hideous sense of guilt always chiefly governed
reassessments she was forced to make of her past. I also came to see that she viewed
her own recent self-history through a filter of self-loathing - apparently not a rare
phenomenon among those who had undergone her particular ordeal." I 59
That Sophie's guilt is "hideous" and "always governing" is evidence that it
plagues her and preys on her mind. The idea that Sophie's moral residue "forces" her
to make reassessments of her past, is evidence that she mulls over her choice
wondering if she chose the right child, and wondering how things would have been
different had she chosen Jan instead ofEva to be gassed. That Sophie assesses,
doubts, and loathes herself is consistent with the aforementioned idea that the
emotions of moral residue are all negative emotions of self-assessment, and that guilt
and shame, specifically, require an internal observer. J60
Sophie's sense of"self-loathing" similarly shows that her residue is not only
negative, but also punitive. Sophie's guilt can thus be seen as her way of punishing
herself for her inability to protect her children and for choosing Eva to be gassed. This
is supported by Stingo's observation that Sophie's moral residue and secrecy parallels
Simon Weil's interpretation of the type of suffering that is like an affliction that
plagues her with scorn, disgust, self-hatred and a corrosive sense of guilt. 161
Sophie's evasion of the truth and her incomplete accounts of the occurrences
in the concentration camps is a recurring theme in the novel. Later, Stingo reflects on
one of Sophie's past fabrications as "another fantasy served up to provide a frail
barrier, a hopeless and crumbly line ofdefence between those she cared for, like
myself, and her smothering guilt.,,162 This extract shows that Sophie's "smothering
guilt" and her punitive, negative assessment ofherself, makes her believe that those
she cares for, namely, Stingo and Nathan, will find her loathsome and possibly even
shun her, for choosing Eva to be gassed. Stingo thus refers to her lies as a
"necessity," as they (like her evasions) are a way of protecting herself from being
judged by others in the same, negative way that she judges herself
159 Styron. 2000, Page 176
160 I say that because Sophie's internal observer would have judged her as doing something wrong and
something in opposition to how she thinks she ought to act as a loving mother. It follows that she
would have been angry at, and ashamed of, herself.
161 Styron. 2000, Page 176
162 Ibid. 2000, Page 288
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Sophie's moral residue is not only evident in her blatant self-loathing, but also
in the evidence ofher desire to colll1l1it suicide. In one interaction with Stingo she
pours out her feelings of guilt and anger and says, "Oh, Stingo, I just can't stand
Living with these things!" Sophie's moral residue is similarly evident by the fact that
she drinks increasingly excessive amoWlts of alcohol, and, in one instance, tries to
drown herself by swimming into the sea drunk and fighting Stingo as he tries to save
her. 163 Once Stingo rescues Sophie and takes her safely to shore she pleads with him
and chastises him for saving her, saying, "Why didn't you let me die? Why didn't
you let me drown? I've been so had - I've been so awful bad!"I64
Sophie's insistence that she is "bad" and her apparent need to escape from
herself and her own guilt culminates at the end of the novel when she eventually
commits suicide. Sophie's extreme self-loathing, guilt, and self-directed anger, is
evidence that she literally cannot live with herself.
Sophie's remorse and her desire to make up for what she does to Eva by trying
to help Jan and prevent him from dying in the Children's Camp also illustrates her
moral residue. There is a sense that if Sophie can protect lan and find him after the
war or influence H6ss to include lan in the Lebensboll1 progranune,I65 then she can
alleviate some of her guilt by taking solace in the fact that she only wrongs one child,
and not both. As she says to Stingo after she finds the courage to tell him about her
choice, "If I found Jan, I might be oh - rescued from all these terrible feelings I still
have, this desire I have had and still have to be ... finished with my life.,,166 Sophie
also says that being able to help lan and protect him from hann might even save her
from some of her guilt.
That (as discussed) Sophie was in such shock in response to her ultimatum,
and that she tried to make up to lan even though she did not choose to send him to the
gas chamber, is evidence that she would have experienced moral residue had she
chosen him to be gassed instead of Eva. To the same extent, that Sophie did not
chose Jan is evidence that she knew she would similarly experience extreme self-
loathing, guilt, shame, and remorse had she chosen him to be gassed. It follows that
the evidence in the novel shows that although Sophie experienced moral residue in
163 Styron, 2000, Page 444
164 Ibid. 2000.
165 Ibid. 2000, Page 503
166 Ibid. 2000, Page 604
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response to chose Eva to be gassed, she would have experienced moral residue
regardless of which alternative she chose to act on.
Evidence of Agamemnon's moral residue
Briefly, Agamemnon is waiting at Aulis with his troops to sail to Troy and avenge
Paris who stole Menelaos' wife, Helen (Agamemnon's sister-in-law). Agamemnon is
stuck at Aulis as the winds will not blow and his troops are thus stranded and
impatient, waiting for favourable weather. The seer Kalchas tells Agamemnon that if
he sacrifices his daughter Iphigenia to the goddess Artemis, "the launch... and the
Trojan's destruction,,,167 will happen and Agamemnon and his troops will be able to
return home. If however, Agamemnon faiJs to sacrifice Iphigenia, then the troops will
remain at Aulis, the war will not end, and the attack on Troy will be abandoned. 168
At the beginning of the play Agamemnon has just changed his decision to
sacrifice Iphigenia as the guilt and shame as her father were too much for him to bear.
Consequently, from the beginning of the play there is evidence of Agamemnon's guilt
and shame at his choice to sacrifice his daughter, and his remorse as he tries to word a
letter intercepting her arrival and tries to make up for his initial choice to sacrifice her.
Agamemnon is stressed, "dashing,,169 around outside his tent, frantically summoning
the Old Man to send the letter, and struggling to write the letter to intercept
Iphigenia's arrival. He has "every sign of going mad," and is visibly "struggling"
with something. 170 We discover that Agamemnon is in distress because he has
deceived his wife Clytemnestra into bringing their daughter to him under the pretext
that she is to be married to Achilles.
In response to his choice, Agamemnon goes through a number of responses:
indecision,17l evasion, deception, madness, and crying - all of which 172 are evidence
of his guilt, shame, and remorse. Evidence of Agamemnon's indecision is clear in his
distress at attempting to compose a letter to prevent Iphigenia from joining him at
Aulis. That he writes the letter after first choosing not to sacrifice Iphigenia, and then
167 Blondel!. 1999. Page 331
168 Ib'd1.1999, Page33l
169 Ibid. 1999, Page 329
170 Ibid. 1999, Page 330
171 Agamemnon first declares that he could not sacrifice Iphigenia He then sends for her under the
f~~se pretext of marriage, then he intercepts her arrival, and then he finally decides to sacrifice her.
As I go on to discuss.
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choosing to sacrifice her, is evidence of his indecision. That Agamernnon then
decides to intercept Iphigenia's arrival is evidence that deceiving and choosing to
sacrifice her is a choice that he initially cannot live with. His indecision and evasion
is evident in the following extract,
"I used these lies on my wife, concocting a fake marriage/
In exchange for my daughter.! the only Greeks who know the truth are Kalchas,
Odysseus, and Menelaos. But then I realised/ how wrong this was! I made it right,!
took back my word, wrote it over again, in this tablet.,,173
This extract shows that Agamemnon is ashamed of his decision to lure
Iphigenia to him so that he can sacrifice her and win the war. He feels guilty and
ashamed about his choice, as in making the choice he is in a sense appointing himself
as Iphigenia's murderer. That he writes the letter intercepting her arrival is similarly
evidence of his remorse as it is a means of reparation - a way of correcting the wrong
that he chooses to do to her. 174
Not only is Agamemnon indecisive but he is also evasive. As illustrated in
the extract cited above, he tells so few people about Kalchas' prophecies, and initially
deceives his family and the troops. Just as Sophie's evasion is evidence that she
despises herself and her choice, so Agamemnon's evasion shows that he too feels
guilty and ashamed. On the one hand, Agamemnon feels guilty for entertaining the
thought of sacrificing his own daughter, and thus wronging her and his family. On
the other hand, he feels guilty for thinking of protecting her and sacrificing Greek
success on the other, as then he will be wronging his troops and his country.
Evidence of Agamemnon's guilt, shame, and remorse about choosing to
sacrifice Iphigenia is seen when he decides that luring Iphigenia to him to be
sacrificed is "wrong" and he wants to make it "right," and when he exclaims, "Oh
God! I was out ofmy mind! Aaaah!,,175 This exclamation shows that he feels remorse.
His outcry shows that he judges himself as being mad or mindless to choose to
sacrifice his own daughter, and that he should make up for what he chooses to do. It
is also evidence that he experiences shame and guilt as he is tormented nearly to the
point ofmadness by the prospect of murdering Iphigenia and having that choice on
his conscience.
173 BlondeU, 1999, Page 332
:~: That is, his choice to sacrifice her and the trickery he used to bring her to Aulis to be sacrificed.
Blondell, 1999, Page 332
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When Agamemnon says, "Oh God! Poor me, what shall I say?/ Where shall I
begin?" I 76 lamenting his highborn position and the fact that he is required to be
composed and not do such "crude" things as dissolve in to tears,177 it shows that his
moral residue in response to choosing to sacrifice Iphigenia is almost unbearable for
him. He is a leader and by nature a composed man, and yet, his decision to sacrifice
Iphigenia for Greek success makes him feel so guilty and ashamed that it reduces him
to tears. 178
When Clytemnestra arrives with Iphigenia at Aulis, Agamemnon fears that
her arrival will destroy him, as she will find him out as the "criminal" he is.\79 This is
evidence that he judges himself as guilty: a morally reprehensible agent and father for
choosing to sacrifice his daughter. He also fears that his wife will judge him similarly.
His moral residue is furthermore evident when he torments himself thinking of
how it will be to teU Iphigenia that he intends to sacrifice her as a "bride ofDeath,"
how she will plead with him saying "will you kill me Daddy?,,180 and how his son
Orestes will hate him. 18\ Agamemnon then breaks down and weeps, and his grief at
his decision to kill Iphigenia is so great that even Menelaos changes his mind and
takes pity on the crying man, admitting that it is not right for Agamemnon to be in so
much "agony.,,182 Agamemnon's severe guilt, remorse, and shame are therefore even
evident to his brother.
Despite his grief and his initial horror at the prospect ofchoosing to sacrifice
Iphigenia, Agamemnon revises his decision and says, "I've reached a point of
inevitability/ I have to shed my daughter's blood - to murder her.,,183 The use of the
word "murder," coupled with the fact that he earlier refers to himself as a
"criminal"l84 is evidence that he loathes himself: he experiences crippling moral
residue.
Agamemnon's moral residue becomes clear when he starts crying again when
faced with Iphigenia's excitement to see him and confusion at his reactions and
176 Ibid. 1999. Page 344
177 Ibid. 1999.
:: That is, Agamemnon knows that his choice will mean wronging Iphigenia and losing her.
Blondel], 1999, Page 344
180 Ibid. 1999.
\8\ That Orestes will hate him is significant as, in Aeschylus· Oresteia, Clytemnestra kills Agamemnon,
and Orestes is left to avenge his father and thus gets embroiled in the curse of the House of Atreus
because of his parent"s actions.
18~
- BJondelL 1999, Page 345
183 Ibid. 1999, Page 346
184 Ibid. 1999, Page 344
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comments. 185 Iphigenia is so willing to please that it hurts Agamemnon, and he gets
more emotional as the irony of her lack of understanding and his intentions unfold.
He says things like "sudden tears come into my eyes when I touch you," to Iphigenia,
and later says to Clytemnestra, "I became too overwhelmed with sorrow, since I am
. . d ht " 186 187gomg to gIve my aug er away.
The most compelling evidence that Agamemnon experiences moral residue in
response to his choice to sacrifice Iphigenia is seen in the following extract from the
Chorus when Iphigenia is just about to be sacrificed,
"When Lord Agamemnon saw the girl! walking in the grove toward the
slaughter/ he groaned, and running hid head away/ he shed tears, holding his cloak in
front of! his eyes.,,188
This shows that Agamemnon is literally guilt-stricken and can barely live with his
decision to sacrifice Iphigenia. His attempt to hide himself is evidence of his guilt
and shame, as is his crying and groaning in despair. This is because the nature of
guilt is such that the agent is plagued by anger at herself for the wrong that she causes
others, and the result is that she, like Agamemnon, endeavours to hide herself
Despite the discussed evidence of Agamemnon's moral residue in response to
choosing to sacrifice Iphigenia, his indecision, and evasion is also evidence of the
moral residue he experiences in response to choosing to save Iphigenia and prevent
his troops from sailing to victory. That he was so indecisive shows that his
commitment to protecting Greece was important to him and implies that he would
have experienced moral residue had he chosen to undermine that commitment as
opposed to his commitment to protect Iphigenia. To the same extent, that he was
evasive is evidence that he was ashamed of entertaining the possibility of protecting
his daughter's life over Greek success, and he did not want his troops to know that he
did not necessarily intend to do all that he could to enable Greek success. Concrete
evidence that Agamemnon would have experienced moral residue in response to
undermining his commitment to Greece is seen in the fact that he eventually chooses
Greek success over protecting Iphigenia's life, even though the prospect of sacrificing
her is like torture to him.
185 Ib·dI . 1999, Page 350-351
186 Ibid. 1999, Page 352
187 The dramatic irony of the latter comment is that while Clyternnestra would interpret what
Agamernnon says as his sadness to give his daughter away in marriage, the audience and Agamemnon
would know that he is alluding to his intention to sacrifice Iphigenia.
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It follows that it is plausible to argue that regardless of which alternative
Agamemnon chose to act on he would have experienced moral residue.
Prima facie case for the moral residue argument in the case studies
In what follows I briefly discuss how Sophie and Agamernnon's cases can, on the
face of it, be used as evidence for how the moral residue argument works to support
the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.
Sophie's corrosive moral residue suggests that her commitment to Jan does not
override her commitment to Eva. Prima facie, it seems plausible to claim that if she
chose to save Eva instead of Jan she would experience similar residue. Thus, it is not
the case that her commitment to Eva overrides her commitment to Jan. She
consequently faces an irresolvable conflict of commitments: a genuine moral
dilemma.
Prima facie, that Agamemnon would experience appropriate moral residue no
matter bow he chooses to act, is evidence that he faces a rationally irresolvable
conflict of commitments: a genuine moral dilemma. This is based on the assumption
that because - like Sophie - Agamemnon could not resolve his choice either way
without experiencing moral residue, the conflict must have been rationally
irresolvable and he must have faced a genuine moral dilemma.
As they stand, these prima facie cases are prey to the objections discussed
above.
Objections
In what follows I discuss how McConnell and Greenspan would respond to this prima
facie case for the moral residue argument. I then discuss how their objections hinge
on particular conceptions ofappropriate moral residue. I argue that these conceptions
are flawed and should be replaced with an account ofappropriate moral residue
understood in terms of integrity. Once moral residue is understood in this way, the
objections no longer hold.
188 Blondell, 1999, Page 386
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According to the first objection, to suppose that Sophie and Agamemnon's
moral residue is appropriate and that they have done something wrong would be
begging the question. 189 The fact that Sophie and Agamemnon experience moral
residue only shows that they have respectively judged themselves as having done
something wrong, and it does not prove that they actually have done anything wrong.
For the moral residue argument to work to prove that Sophie and Agamemnon have
done something wrong thus requires assuming that both of them face a choice
between two equally obligatory commitments, i.e. that they each face a genuine moral
dilemma. In this way, according to the first objection, the moral residue argument
begs the question and thus cannot show that genuine moral dilemmas exist.
The first objection understands the moral residue argument as being based on
the assumption that the way to establish appropriateness is to assume wrongdoing and
that in order to assume wrongdoing, it is necessary to assume that the agent faces a
genuine moral dilemma where one commitment does not override the other. In other
words, this objection works by implying that there is no independent way to establish
wrongdoing. ill what follows I argue that it is not necessary to assume a genuine
moral dilemma to establish appropriate moral residue in order for the argument to
work. First, it is my claim that the account of appropriateness implicit in this first
objection misses the point about what "appropriateness" and "wrongness" has to
consist in.
The "badness" or the "appropriateness" ofthe moral residue must consist in the
relation that the agent stands to that action i.e. her doing it. There is a prima facie case
that Sophie sending Eva to be gassed was a bad and wrong thing to do. This is based
on Sophie's own negative self-assessment. Assuming the existence ofa genuine
moral dilemma, however, fails to provide a way of evaluating whether or not such a
judgments is accurate or justified. To detennine whether an agent's assessment that
she has done wrong is justified must be assessed by looking precisely at what has
been judged. That is, we need to consider agents like Sophie and Agamemnon's
negative self-assessment of shame, guilt, or remorse in relation (to use Williams'
phrase in Ethical Consistency) to the particular action that they did. We can imagine
many different situations and factors that might possibly (if not plausibly) lead to
Sophie sending Eva to be gassed. For example, had Sophie chosen Eva to be gassed in
189 S' Amnott- rmstrong, 1988, Page 47
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a fit of blind rage when Eva was irritating her so much that Sophie was temporarily
mindless, in the event that she experiences moral residue after her choice, it would be
appropriate. This is because Sophie would be doing something wrong.
There will still be a prima facie case that the action is bad or wrong. Why she
did it (because ofan apparent dilemma or blind rage) might be relevant to the degree
to which to hold her responsible or blameworthy. It remains, however, that in
evaluating and explaining her negative self-assessment and deciding whether it is
justified or appropriate, we need to look precisely at what she did. To look only at
why she did it is to miss the force of the point about moral residue - what it is about
her standing in this relation to this action that might be judged bad or wrong.
The first objection thus leaves out the possibility that if an agent has not faced
a dilemma and still undermines a commitment, she will similarly have done
something wrong and will experience appropriate moral residue. Consequently, the
first objection is flawed, as, in the discussed example of Sophie in a fit of blind rage,
Sophie's moral residue is appropriate even though it is caused by a choice that she
makes for reasons other than a rationally irresolvable conflict ofcommitments. To
the same extent, if Agamemnon chooses to sacrifice Iphigenia just because, for
example, he thinks that it might be a good idea and might gain him increased
happiness in his afterlife, ifhe experiences moral residue appropriately it would be
because of his choice to sacrifice her, and not because he necessarily faces a rationally
irresolvable conflict of commitments. 190
The second objection is that it is not inappropriate to experience moral residue,
even in cases where the agent has done nothing wrong. Thus, Sophie and
Agamemnon's moral residue cannot point to their having done something wrong.
This is a problem because if proponents are to use an agent' SI 91 moral residue to
prove the existence ofgenuine moral dilemmas, then they have to be able to show that
she has done something wrong. This is because the notion ofappropriate moral
residue depends on the agent having done something wrong. The implication of the
second objection, however, is that even if proponents can show that the moral residue
is appropriate, it does not show anything and thus it call1lot be used as evidence that
190 Although I go on to discuss exactly why the objection is flawed in more detail n due course. I now
ft0 on to outline the second objection and how that works. .
91 Like Sophie and Agamemnon.
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the agents have done anything wrong. Thus, there is no evidence that one
commitment did not override the other.
For example, although Sophie chooses Eva to be gassed, she has no malicious
intent and does not want to choose either of her children to be gassed. Agamemnon
likewise does not ideally want to have to choose between sacrificing Iphigenia and
sacrificing the success of his war against Paris. Such cases are on a par with the
woman who nms the little boy over when he drops his favourite marble behind her
car: although her moral residue is appropriate, according to the second objection, it is
plausible to say that she has done nothing wrong, in the sense that she is not morally
blameworthy.
Greenspan allows for guilt without moral responsibility and thus a subjective
definition ofdilemmas would only seem to imply the prima facie wrongness of either
alternative. In It follows that according to the second objection, what an agent like
Sophie or Agamemnon does in a dilemma, or how they chose to act in a dilemma,
might not necessarily count as wrong all things considered under the circumstances. 193
This is because the second objection is based on the conception that emotions of
moral residue like guilt, need not involve the corresponding evaluative judgment, and
thus an agent like Sophie can feel guilty, although it is plausible to argue that she does
nothing wrong.
As Greenspan argues, "Guilt is sometimes appropriate, in contrast to blame,
when we do not have adequate warrant for the correspondingjudgment.,,194 It follows
that for the moral residue argument to work, the agent has to be morally responsible
for her action, as only then will she have done something wrong, and only then can
appropriate moral residue support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. The
presence ofmoral residue, however, is not itself evidence that the agent has done
something wrong in the relevant sense (i.e. something that she is morally
blameworthy for having done). The reasoning is as follows:
I) Appropriate moral residue needs to show that the agent has done something
wrong for it to prove that there are cases that satisfy the conditions ofa
genuine moral dilemma.
192 Greenspan, 1995, Page 152
193 Ibid. 1995, Page \77
194 Ibid. 1995, Page 152
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2) According to the first objection, the moral residue argument begs the question
as it asswnes that genuine moral conflicts exist and necessitate that the agent
does wrong no matter how she acts.
3) According to the second objection, the moral residue argwnent begs the
question as it assumes that if an agent experiences moral residue she has
necessarily done something wrong i.e. for which she is morally blameworthy -
and yet - there are cases where it is not inappropriate to experience moral
residue even when the agent has done nothing wrong.
4) Given 3), there are cases where an agent's appropriate moral residue does not
prove that she has done something wrong.
5) Given 3), and 4), 1) does not hold.
6) Thus, given 2) and 5), the moral residue argwnent does not hold.
In terms of the second objection, even ifSophie and Agamemnon's moral residue is
appropriate, it does not tell us whether agents like them are morally blameworthy and
it is thus not evidence of their wrongdoing. 195 It remains, however, that like the first
objection, the second objection's conception ofappropriate moral residue is flawed.
Although somewhat elusive, the notion ofappropriate moral residue is crucial
to the efficacy of the moral residue argwnent. The interpretations ofappropriate
moral residue assumed in the objections, however, both seem to be flawed.
The first objection assumes a conception of moral residue that neither
considers nor explains precisely what is wrong, if anything, with the agent choosing
the particular action that she does. For example in Sophie's case, to asswne that the
ultimatum Or von Niemand gives her is the reason that her moral residue is
appropriate, fails to show that in choosing Eva to be gassed she does something
wrong. Similarly, in Agamemnon's case, to argue that his choice is evidence that his
moral residue is appropriate, fails to show that in sacrificing his daughter he likewise
does something wrong.
The understanding of appropriate asswned in the first objection thus misses the
strength of the point about moral residue. The choice or the ultimatum that the agent
faces is only an indirect cause ofmoral residue. The direct cause is the fact that the
agent chooses to do something that is wrong (namely, choosing Eva to be gassed or
195 The objectively appropriate response may be regret and not remorse, as remorse involves the agent
having caused or done something wrong, whereas regret can be experienced even in cases where the
agent is not causally responsible in any way.
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Iphigenia to be sacrificed). The objection fails to consider or explain what, if
anything; the ''wrongness'' of the agent perfonning that particular action might consist
in. According to the first objection, the moral residue argument can thus only explain
the difficult choice, as opposed to explaining that choices like sacrificing a daughter,
sacrificing military success as a leader, or choosing a daughter to be gassed are wrong
and cause an agent to feel guilt, remorse, and shame. As it stands, therefore, the
conception of appropriateness on which the first objection hinges, fails to explain
precisely what is wrong, if anything, about the agent's choice and action: it looks in
the wrong place for what "wrongness" consists in.
As with the first objection, the account of appropriateness assumed in the
second objection is similarly problematic. Firstly, because it is indiscriminate and
fails to explain precisely what it is about being causally or morally responsible for that
action that merits the severe self-judgement ofmoral residue. For example, if we
allow Greenspan that Sophie may not necessarily have done anything morally
blameworthy in choosing Eva to be gassed, how can Sophie's crippling feelings of
guilt, shame and remorse be explained? Secondly, Greenspan's account of
appropriateness relies on too strict an understanding ofdoing wrong i.e. that an agent
who does wrong is morally blameworthy. Such a conception, however, does not
adequately explain the appropriateness ofmoral residue in cases where the agent
experiences moral residue for doing something that is wrong, but for which she is not
morally blameworthy. 196
It follows that the conception of appropriate moral residue that Greenspan
assumes similarly misses the point of moral residue as it fails to consider precisely
what is wrong, if anything, with the agent performing the particular action that she
does. I say that because it limits wrongdoing to choices for which the agent is
morally responsible - and yet it remains that agent's like Sophie and Agamemnon
seem to have done something wrong in choosing to act as they do, and thus
Greenspan's account is flawed because it cannot a) say what they do wrong, or b)
explain why they experience moral residue if they do nothing wrong.
196 For example, while Sophie has done something wrong and something that she feels bad about it is
plausible to argue that she is not morally blameworthy on the basis that she did not want Eva to be
g~sed, in the same way that the woman who ran over the little boy did something wrong and yet
neither meant to nor wanted to.
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In this way neither conception captures or considers exactly what it is that
makes moral residue appropriate or inappropriate, because both conceptions of doing
wrong and the notion ofappropriate moral residue are flawed.
An adequate understanding of appropriate moral residue via integrity
In what follows I offer an interpretation ofdoing something wrong and appropriate
moral residue in terms of integrity - an account that provides a more precise
explanation of the agent doing wrong in these cases. My account considers and
captures precisely what it is about an agent doing a certain action that makes moral
residue appropriate if it is present and inappropriate if it is not. That is, my account
considers more closely than either of the objections, where the negative self-
assessment has to come from ifit is to be appropriate. Moreover, in establishing
appropriate moral residue my account makes use of the independent standard of
integrity that the fIrst objection implied was not available.
In order to show why my account of appropriate moral residue is better than
the accounts assumed in the objections, I demonstrate how my interpretation of
appropriate moral residue can show exactly what is going on when agents like Sophie
and Agamemnon make negative self-assessments and experience moral residue (a loss
of integrity). I can thus evaluate whether that loss is real or apparent. This can be
done by detennining whether there is a loss of integrity and whether the moral residue
is appropriate or not. This argwnent does not miss the force ofmoral residue, nor is it
too indiscriminate an account ofappropriate or too strict an account ofdoing
wrong. 197
I thus reply to the objections with the claim that moral residue is appropriate
iffthe agent has undermined, violated, or compromised her integrity in some way. In
order to establish whether Sophie and Agamemnon's shame, guilt, and remorse
satisfy my account of appropriateness, I establish whether or not they have integrity.
Thereafter I show how both cases ofmoral residue can be used to satisfY the sufficient
conditions of a genuine moral dilemma.
In order to discern whether Sophie and Agamemnon have integrity I establish
whether they satisfY the conditions established in the previous section. These
197 Like the second objection.
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conditions are 1) That Sophie and Agamemnon are committed to certain principles, 2)
That the commitments are such that they can conflict with their desires, 3) That they
uphold those commitments in the face of temptation or challenge, 4) That they can
thus both face the possibility of losing their integrity by undermining their
commitments, and 5) That they have an authentic relation to their principles, and thus,
that they have coherence.
Integrity in case 1: Sophie
It is evident that Sophie is somehow committed to protecting and caring for both Jan
and Eva and that she is committed to protect them from being sent to the gas chamber.
It is at least clear that Sophie's moral residue in response to choosing Eva shows that
Sophie's commitment to protect Eva could not be a defeasible commitment. Were it a
defeasible commitment, Sophie would tmdermine it without experiencing remorse,
and yet her moral residue - as discussed - shows that this is not the case. There is also
evidence to support the fact that Sophie's commitment to Jan is similarly not a
defeasible commitment. For example, when faced with her choice Sophie screams, "I
can't choose! I can't choose!" feels faint, is in total, "deranged" disbelief, and begins
to scream hysterically. 198 That Sophie is in a physical state of shock, and given that
she declares her inability to choose, shows that she cannot sacrifice her commitment
to protect either child without remorse.
If Sophie' s commitment to Jan were a defeasible commitment, then her
commitment to Eva would override her commitment to Jan. Furthermore, were either
of her commitments defeasible, she would choose to undeITIline that defeasible
commitment and she would not feel remorse, guilt, or shame in doing so. It remains,
however, that she does experience moral residue, and she does undermine an identity-
conferring commitment to protect Eva from being gassed. It follows that both of her
commitments must be identity-conferring. My reasoning is as follows:
1) Commitments are either defeasible commitments or identity-conferring
commitments. 199
2) By definition, defeasible commitments cannot be sacrificed without moral
residue and can thus be overridden by identity-conferring commitments.
198 Styron, 2000, Page 594
199 a1McF 1,1987, Page 12
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3) There is evidence that Sophie experiences moral reside in response to
undermining her commitment to protect Eva.
4) Thus, Sophie does not have a defeasible commitment to protect Eva, but rather
has an identity-conferring commitment to protect Eva.
5) Given 2) and 4), was Sophie's commitment to Jan a defeasible commitment,
she would sacrifice Jan as opposed to Eva.
6) Sophie does not sacrifice Jan.
7) Therefore, both of Sophie's commitments to her children must be identity-
conferring commitments.
Given the definition of identity-conferring commitments as important, unconditional
commitments that determine the agent's identity to a large extent, it follows that a part
ofSophie's identity is as a mother unable to choose either ofher children to be
gassed, on the basis that part of who she is, is determined by her commitment to
protect both of her children from harm. This case is further strengthened by her
subsequent loss of identity and her inability to live with herself once she chooses Eva
to be gassed.
Sophie thus meets the first necessary condition of integrity as she has identity-
conferring commitments to protect both Jan and Eva from hann?OO This can be seen
from the argument above and the afore-discussed evidence of her moral residue.
The second necessary condition of integrity is also met.201 I say that because
Sophie's commitments to Jan and Eva are important commitments that can potentially
conflict with her desires. For example, her commitment to protect both of her
children from harm has the potential to conflict with things like her commitment to
protect herself from harm. An example is when she risks her own life and throws
herself at the mercy of Hoss in an attempt to help Jan.202 Although I discuss this
instance again in due course, my point at this stage of the argument is that an agent
like Sophie who makes identity-conferring commitments to protect both of her
200 I discuss her commitments to her children again at a later stage.
201 Although it may appear that I am moving quickly at this stage, in what follows I give a concrete
example from the text that shows how Sophie meets the first three conditions of integrity.
202 This occurs when Sophie is in the concentration camp and has not seen lan since they arrived, and
she tries to coerce, seduce and beg Hoss to let her see lan and to include him in the Lebensbom
programme. She does this so that she can rest in the knowledge that lan will at least not freeze to death
in the children's camp and she will at least be able to seek solace in the fact that she did her best and
was able to protect lan from dying as well.
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children from harm makes commitments that can conflict with her own personal,
interests or desires.
Sophie's situation meets the third necessary condition of integrity as, before her
choice, she upholds her commitments to protect each ofher children from harm in the
face of temptation or challenge. That Sophie's commitments meet the first three
necessary conditions of integrity can be seen in the account of one of Sophie's
discussions with Wanda. Wanda is a revolutionary friend ofSophie's, and during the
discussion, Sophie refuses to help the Home Army because it would jeopardise Jan
and Eva's safety.203 It remains, however, that in such a case, Sophie may be tempted
to help the Home Army and Wanda.
This is because Wanda is her friend, and Sophie herself may want to help her
fellow countrymen and may want to feel that she is contributing in the fight for
freedom. Wanda can also be seen as a challenge to Sophie's commitments, as Wanda
tries to coerce Sophie by accusing her of being unlike other women - women prepared
to help the Home Army. Sophie, however, upholds her commitments to each of her
children in the face of challenge and temptation. As she says, "I'm myse(f!204 I have to
act according to my conscience. You don't have children. It's easy for you to talk
like this. I cannot jeopardise the lives of my children. They're having a hard enough
time of it as it is. ,,205
This extract shows that Sophie places her commitments to protect her children
from harm and stress before her commitment to her friends, her opposition to anti-
Semitism, and herself.206 The fact that Sophie's situation meets the first three
necessary conditions of integrity implies that the fourth necessary condition is also
met and that Sophie faced the possibility oflOSS.207
Sophie's case also meets the fifth necessary condition of integrity as she has an
authentic relation to the principles to which she commits herself Sophie's
commitments are coherent in the sense that her principles, commitments, and actions
are consistent, and she is committed to protecting her children from harm for the right
reasons. As a loving mother, Sophie recognises that protecting her children from
203 This conversation takes place before they were taken to the concentration camp.
204 As opposed to other women prepared to help in the Home Army.
205 Styron, 2000, Page 453
206 This can be seen as further evidence that her commitments were not defeasible. I say that because
her commitments to protect Jan and Eva overrode her other commitments as opposed t~ the other way
around.
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hann is important, commits herself to that, and acts in accordance with that
commitment. Sophie is committed to protect her children for the right reasons
because she is a loving mother who recognises that her children's lives are important
and valuable, and she thus wants to protect them from hann.
Evidence that Sophie has an authentic relation to her commitments and
coherence can be seen in her selflessness, and the sacrifices that she makes for her
children. If she did not want to protect her children from hann, then she would not
sacrifice her dignity (as she did when she grovels at Hoss's feet and pleads with him
to include lan in the Lebensbom programme208). She would similarly not sacrifice
her ideals (as she does when she keeps her father's pamphlet promoting anti-Semitism
as a possible bargaining card to help her children209), nor would she sacrifice her
commitments to fiiends like Wanda and socio-moral causes210 like helping the Home
Anny.
That there is evidence that Sophie has identity-conferring commitments,
coupled with the fact that her situation meets the sufficient conditions of integrity,
means that, in making her choice, Sophie violates an identity-conferring commitment.
This is because appropriate moral residue is a question of the agent a) having integrity
and b) the choice that caused the agent's moral residue is a choice that involves the
agent undennining, compromising, or violating her integrity. According to my
argument, these two things can be established independently of the dilemmic situation
and the moral residue it causes.
By my account, Sophie's moral residue is therefore appropriate.211 This is
because Sophie has integrity (as I established independently of her moral residue),
and her integrity is tied to her identity-conferring commitments to her children (also
established independently). Thus, her moral residue is evidence ofa rea/loss of
integrity and is thus appropriate as Sophie does something wrong by making a choice
that compromises her integrity.
207 Although moral residue just is evidence of loss, I go on to discuss how Sophie experienced loss as a
result of her commitments to her children in more detail in due course.
208 Styron, 2000, Page 349
209 b'dI I . 2000, Page 572
110 These were causes she seemed to believe in, as there is evidence that she questioned whether she
was doing the right thing in not helping the Home Army.
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Integrity in case 2: Agamemnon
Like Sophie, Agamemnon's choice can similarly be interpreted in terms ofthe
independent standard of integrity. In the likelihood that both of his choices would
involve a violation of his integrity, it is plausible to argue that he would do something
wrong no matter how he chooses to act.
In order to establish whether Agamemnon has integrity, it is necessary to
discem whether he has identity-conferring commitments to both Iphigenia and
Greece. On the face of it his commitments are as follows:
1) He has a public commitment as a leader and general in the war to avenge
Menelaos and Greece.
2) Thus, he has a commitment to sacrifice Iphigenia to enable his troops to sail to
Troy and defeat Paris.
3) He also has a private commitment as a loving father and husband to protect his
daughter Iphigenia.
4) Thus, he has a commitment not to sacrifice Iphigenia and to prevent his troops
from sailing to Troy to defeat Paris.
It remains; however, that Agamemnon's commitments are more complicated than
they seem. His commitment to Iphigenia involves a commitment to his wife to be a
good husband and protect their children, and it also involves a commitment as a
loving father and provider to protect his family from harm. On the other hand, his
commitment to Greece and - as a leader - ensuring Greek success at all costs,
involves defending his brother's honour, and involves preventing his troops from
staying at Aulis and away from their families any longer. Given his choice,
Agamemnon faces a terrible burden in his double role as father and leader of the
expedition. He must choose between his role as leader of the Greeks and his role as
head of his family, between his public responsibilities and the obligations of head of
the family.m
211 That is, appropriate moral residue in the sense that the agent has undermined, violated, or
compromised her integrity in some way.
212 Blondell, 1999, Page 311
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It is evident that Agamemnon has an identity-conferring commitment to
Iphigenia, because he admits that killing her fills him with horror,213 is unstable,
changes his mind constantly, frequently gives in to tears, and at times seems on the
verge of madness.2 14 The evidence of his moral residue shows that he cannot
undermine his commitment to protect Iphigenia without experiencing remorse, guilt,
and shame. It follows that although he eventually chooses to sacrifice her, his
commitment to Greece does not override his commitment to Iphigenia, as in choosing
to sacrifice her he feels substantial moral residue, regards himselfas a "criminal" and
a "murderer," and is at times so guilt-stricken that he changes his mind and chooses to
save her at the expense ofwinning the war and maintaining Greek pride. For example,
he admits that his "earlier intention" to sacrifice Iphigenia for his troops was
"wrong,,,215 and he maintains that he will conduct his affairs in the "right way." As he
says,
"I will not kill my children. It would be unjust. . .1 I'll be worn out every night,
every day, with tears,! because I committed unjust crimes against my child." 216
This extract shows that Agamemnon's commitment as a father to protect Iphigenia, is
an identity-conferring commitment that cannot be sacrificed without remorse and that
is not overridden by other commitments. The extract shows that he can barely
conceive of sacrificing his daughter, and because he knows that - ifhe does - he will
be overcome with negative emotions of self-assessment: moral residue.
It is plausible to claim that Agamemnon also has an identity-conferring
commitment to Greece. He appoints himself general in the war against Tray, and
because he eventually chooses to sacrifice his daughter for Greek success, both of
which are evidence that he commits himself to Greece because he wants to and he
recognises it as an important commitment.217 That he has identity-conferring
commitment to both Iphigenia and Greece is evident when he says, "I am ashamed to
shed tears218 - / but just as ashamed as ifl don't weep, / faced with such a
catastrophe.,,219 This extract shows that Agamemnon does not know what to do, and
although he is ashamed to cry about his choice to sacrifice Iphigenia as - in so doing
213 Ibid. 1999, Page 375
214 lb'd 91 . 1 99, Page 314
215 Ibid. 1999, Page 341
216 Ibid. 1999, Page 342
217 I discuss this in more detail in due course.
218 That is, tears at the prospect of Iphigenia's sacrifice.
219 Blondell, 1999, Page 344
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he undennines his commitment as a leader to be composed and do whatever it takes to
honour Greece and makes Greece successful - he is also ashamed not to cry for
Iphigenia, as, in so doing, he undennines his commitment as a father to protect her.
In this way, just as Sophie's commitment to Jan could not have been a
defeasible commitment, so Agamemnon's commitment to Greece could not be a
defeasible commitment. My reasoning is as follows:
I) Commitments are either defeasible or identity-conferrring.
2) By definition, defeasible commitments can be sacrificed without moral residue
and can thus be overridden by identity-conferring commitments.
3) There is evidence that Agamemnon experiences moral residue in response to
undennining his commitment to protect Iphigenia.
4) Thus, Agamemnon does not have a defeasible commitment to protect
Iphigenia, but rather has an identity-conferring commitment to protect
lphigenia.
5) Given 2) and 4), had Agamemnon's commitment to Greece been a defeasible
commitment, he would have sacrificed his success in the war against Troy as
opposed to sacrificing Iphigenia.
6) Agamemnon did not sacrifice his success in the war against Troy.
7) Therefore, both of Agarnemnon's commitments to lphigenia and Greece
respectively must have been identity-conferring commitments.
That his commitment to Greece could not have been a defeasible commitment is
furthennore evident in the fact that despite the moral residue he experiences in
response to choosing Iphigenia to be sacrifice, he still chooses to sacrifice her at the
end. His indecision is similarly evidence that his commitment to Greece was not a
defeasible commitment. If it were a defeasible commitment, he would sacrifice it
easily and without remorse, he would make his decision quickly, and he would not
choose to sacrifice his daughter in the knowledge that he probably could not forgive
himselffor doing that as he did.
Given the definition of identity-conferring commitments as important,
unconditional commitments that determine the agent's identity to a large extent, it
follows that a part of Agamemnon' s identity was both I) as a father being unable to
sacrifice his own daughter, and 2) as a leader and general in the war unable to
sacrifice the success of his expedition to Troy. This can be seen in the moral residue
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he experiences in response to his respective choices. Agamemnon thus meets the first
necessary condition ofintegrity as he has identity-conferring commitments to both
Iphigenia and Greece.
Agamernnon also meets the second necessary condition of integrity as his
respective commitments have the potential to conflict. This is clear because his
commitment as a father to protect Iphigenia conflicts with his commitment as a leader
to win the war and protect Greek honour at all costs. Furthermore, his commitment to
protect Iphigenia conflicts with his desire to avenge Menelaos' honour, to be a good
leader, and to do what is right by his troops and his country. Similarly, his
commitment to Greece conflicts with his desire to be a good father and husband, to
protect Iphigenia, and to send her home and shield her from the fate that awaits her.
Agamernnon also meets the third necessary condition of integrity as he
upholds his commitments in the face ofchallenge. For example, he upholds his
commitment to protect Iphigerua when he intercepts the message and tries to prevent
her from coming to Aulis. In such a case, the temptation is that he should put his
emotions and instincts as a father aside and concentrate on his position as military
general and Greek leader.220 There is similarly evidence that he upholds his
commitment to Greece, because he appoints himself general in the war against Troy
and mobilises the troops at Aulis to defeat Paris (despite the temptation to leave
Menelaos to fight his own battles). Furthermore, he sacrifices Iphigenia despite the
personal cost to him as her father and the temptation to act on his emotions and his
responsibilities as a father.
He also satisfies the fourth necessary condition of integrity as he faces the
possibility ofloss. That is, he faces the possibility oflosing his daughter and his
identity as a loving father on the one hand, and similarly faces the possibility of losing
the war and his identity as a reputable leader on the other.
Agamernnon furthermore satisfies the fifth - and last - necessary condition.
There is evidence that he has an authentic relation to his principles: that his principles
and commitments are consistent, that his commitments and his actions are consistent,
and that he is committed to the right things for the right reasons. In terms ofhis
commitment to Iphigenia, Agamernnon is committed to her because he is her father.
220 Although he admittedly decides to sacrifice Iphigenia at the end of the play, it remains that in the
context of that section of the play he upholds his commitment as a father to protect Iphigenia and tries
to prevent her from arriving at Aulis.
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He (like Sophie) recognises that the principle of being a loving parent is an important
one and he commits himself to that. Furthermore, his actions reflect this: I) he
initially states that he cannot sacrifice his daughter, 2) he later tries to intercept
Iphigenia's arrival, 3) he embraces Iphigenia and talks fondly to her on her arrival,
and 4) he sobs and cries repeatedly at the prospect of sacrificing ber - all of which
show that he loves Iphigenia, tries to protect her, and is committed to that. His
commitment to Iphigenia is also coherent as he commits himself to her because he
recognises it as important for a father to protect and care for his daughter. Thus he,
like Sophie, wants to protect and care for his child (hence his distress at the prospect
of sacrificing her).
On the other hand, there is evidence to show that Agamemnon similarly has
an authentic relation to his commitment as a leader: 1) he is committed to being a
leader because he recognises the principle of maintaining Greek honour and pride, 2)
his actions reflect his commitments as he chooses to mobilise the troops and lead the
war against Troy and Paris, and 3) because he eventually chooses to sacrifice
Iphigenia. Furthermore, he is committed to leading Greece and the expedition against
Paris because he recognises that it is important for Menelaos's honour (and his wife)
to be restored, and he commits himself to that because, as a leader, he wants to defend
Greece and Greek honour.221
It folJows that Agamemnon has an authentic relation to his commitment to
protect Iphigenia, and to his commitment to protect Greece, and that he thus has
coherence.
Given the evidence that Agamemnon has identity-conferring commitments
to both Iphigenia and Greece, and given that his situation meets the necessary
conditions of integrity, means that no matter which option Agamemnon chooses to act
on, he would compromise his integrity.
That Agamemnon has integrity can be established independently, just as the
fact that Agamemnon has identity-conferring commitments to both Iphigenia and
Greece can be established independently. By independently I mean it can be
established without assuming a) that his guilt is necessarily evidence that he does
something wrong in the sense that he can be held morally blameworthy, or b) that his
221 If Agamemnon did not want to defend Greek honour and be a reputable leader, then he would not
have volunteered to lead the expedition against Troy, would not be a general in the war, and would not
have prevented mutiny and the possibility of abandoning the expedition, by sacrificing Iphigenia
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moral residue is necessarily evidence that he faces a rationally irresolvable conflict of
commitments and thus, a genuine moral dilemma. Agamemnon's moral residue is
therefore evidence ofa loss of integrity, and, is thus appropriate.
The moral residue argument revisited
As discussed in the second chapter Terence McConnell argues that the moral residue
argument has to show the following: 1) when the agent acts she experiences moral
residue, 2) that she experiences moral residue is appropriate, 3) had she acted on the
other alternative she would also have experienced moral residue, and 4) in the latter
case these emotions would have been equally appropriate.m
In tenns of my interpretation ofappropriate moral residue, both Sophie and
Agamemnon satisfy McConnell's conditions. Sophie's situation meets the first
condition because she experiences moral residue after choosing Eva to be gassed, and
Agamemnon meets the first condition because he experiences moral residue after
choosing to sacrifice Iphigenia. Sophie similarly meets McConnell's second
condition because her moral residue is appropriate. TIlls is because she has an
identity-conferring commitment to protect Eva from hann, and in choosing her to be
gassed, Sophie undermines that commitment and, thus, her integrity. To the same
extent, Agamemnon has an identity-conferring commitment to Iphigenia, and in
choosing her to be sacrificed, he undermines that commitment, and thus, his integrity.
It follows that both Sophie and Agamemnon' s moral residue is appropriate, and that
they both meet McConnell's first two conditions.
Given that Sophie similarly has an identity-conferring commitment to protect
Jan from harm, had she chosen the other alternative - for Jan to be gassed - she would
also experience appropriate moral residue. As Agamemnon's commitment to Greece
is similarly an identity-conferring commitment, it follows that ifhe had chosen to
sacrifice his commitment to Greece and save Iphigenia from being sacrificed, he
would have experienced appropriate moral residue. Therefore, both Sophie and
Agamemnon satisfy the four conditions that McConnell argues should be true for the
moral residue argument to work.
222 McConnel1 in Mason, 1996, Pages 36-37
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I am now in a position to show how it follows from the existence of Sophie and
Agamemnon's appropriate moral residue that the necessary and sufficient conditions
for a genuine moral dilemma are met
I have already independently established that Sophie and Agamemnon have
integrity and thus that their moral residue is appropriate, because their respective
choices involve undermining their integrity. Given that they both have integrity
means that while Sophie has identity-conferring commitments to protect both Jan and
Eva, Agamemnon has identity-conferring commitments to protect both Iphigenia and
Greece. It follows that in having to choose between their identity-conferring
commitments, both Sophie and Agamemnon face a conflict.
That their moral residue is appropriate shows that both of their conflicts are
rationally irresolvable. By nature, identity-conferring commitments cannot be
overridden, and thus Sophie and Agamemnon cannot sacrifice either of their
commitments without experiencing appropriate moral reside and thus a loss of
integrity. That they both face a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments means
that they both satisfy the first necessary condition ofa genuine moral dilemma.
That both Sophie and Agamemnon's moral residue is appropriate is similarly
evidence that both of their choices satisfy the second necessary condition ofa genuine
moral dilemma. Both of their commitments are identity-conferring, thus the fact that
they would both experience appropriate moral residue no matter which alternative
they choose to act on is proof that they will inevitably compromise their integrity and
face loss.
I say that for two reasons. First, as my discussion of appropriate moral
residue shows, no matter how they act they will compromise their integrity, thus it
follows that they both face an inevitable loss of integrity. Second, given that integrity
depends on identity-conferring commitments, no matter how Sopbie and Agamemnon
choose to act, they will similarly compromise their identity and thus lose a part of
their identity. Regardless of which child Sophie chooses to be gassed, she will betray
her conception of herself as a mother committed to protecting both of her children
from harm. Likewise, whether Agamemnon chooses to sacrifice Iphigenia or
sacrifice his expedition to Troy, he will similarly betray his conception of himselfas a
father committed to protecting his daughter, or as a leader committed to protecting
Greek honour.
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Consequently, their appropriate moral residue understood in terms of
integrity, is evidence that whatever choice either of them makes will be "a suicide ofa
sort;" as either action would destroy them and their integrity,223 and would be wrong.
Both Sophie and Agamemnon thus satisfy the first two necessary conditions ofa
genuine moral dilemma: a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments and loss.
Objection: incoherence and apparent dilemmas
As we saw in chapter I, that these two conditions can be met is not sufficient to
establish that a genuine moral dilemma exists. Opponents could argue that although
appropriate moral residue understood in terms of integrity can satisfy the conflict and
loss conditions - it still fails to support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. This
is because the situation condition is not satisfied. Opponents could thus argue that
Sophie and Agarnernnon's commitments are incoherent, and thus a) that they only
face an apparently irresolvable conflict of commitments and b) that the situation in
which they find themselves' is caused by their own irrationality, and does not point to
the reality of genuine moral dilemmas. In other words, that Sophie and Agamernnon
face rationally irresolvable conflicts is a result of their holding incoherent
commitments. If they were to be rational then they would not face the apparent
dilemma.
If Sophie and Agamernnon's commitments were incoherent, then the dilemma
would be their fault, and not the fault ofthe world.224 It would thus be the case that
their appropriate moral residue could not be used to support the existence of genuine
moral dilemmas. Opponents could argue that on the basis that Sophie and
Agamernnon's cases - although they satisfy the conditions of conflict and loss - do
not satisfy the condition that their situations are imposed on them by the world. In this
way, if their commitments are incoherent, it follows that their dilemmas are only
apparent.
IfSophie and Agamemnon's commitments are incoherent, then their
commitments cannot both be identity-conferring. This is because of the definition of
integrity and the nature of identity-conferring commitments. By that I mean that if one
(or neither) oftheir commitments are identity-conferring, then at least one
223 McFall, 1987, Page 13-14
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commitment must be defeasible. If at least one of Sophie and Agamemnon' s
commitments are defeasible then they can sacrifice that defeasible commitment
without experiencing appropriate moral residue. The implication if their
commitments are incoherent is threefold. Firstly, they will not necessarily undermine
their integrity. Secondly, their moral residue will not necessarily be appropriate, and
thirdly, neither of them will necessarily face a choice that meets the sufficient
conditions of a genuine moral dilemma
There is an easy way to overcome this objection: I have argued that whether or
not moral residue is appropriate depends on whether a) the agent has integrity and b)
whether the choice resulting in moral residue undermines the agent's integrity.
Sophie and Agamemnon meet both a) and b) and thus their moral residue is
appropriate. The fact that their moral residue is appropriate means that the situation
condition is met. I say that because if Sophie and Agamemnon have integrity then
they necessarily have an authentic relation to their commitments and thus: coherence.
It follows from the presence of appropriate moral residue that the situation condition
is met. If a) Sophie and Agamemnon have integrity (that involves coherence) and b)
the choice that causes that moral residue compromises their integrity, then moral
residue is appropriate. Thus, part ofestablishing appropriate moral residue is
establishing their coherence. Consequently, the argument for appropriate moral
residue is at the same time an argument that the situation condition can be met.
It remains, however, to argue that the claim that Sophie's commitments to
protect both Jan and Eva are incoherent, is implausible. If opponents were to argue
that her commitments are incoherent, then they would have to argue that - likewise -
all mothers who have identity-conferring commitments to both (or all) of their
children are incoherent. Such an argument, however, seems both trivial and
unacceptable. This is because it would allow some sort ofranking system that would
IUn contrary to human experience and common conceptions ofwhat an admirable
human being and a good mother is.
Ifit were the case that mothers who have identity-conferring commitments to
protect both of their children from harm are incoherent, then it would mean that
mothers with more than one child will have to rank their commitments to, say, protect
their children from harm. For example, a mother could rank her commitments to her
224 In the sense explained in chapter 1.
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children in terms of their capabilities and potential for success and could thus have an
identity-conferring commitment to protect child A because he is highly intelligent and
may one day become a doctor, an important, defeasible commitment to protect child
B because she is good at ballet and may one day become a prima ballerina, and a
defeasible commitment to protect child C who is not particularly good at anything.
However, we would judge Sophie more severely, deem her a morally
reprehensible agent, (and mother) if she did not have equally important, identity-
conferring commitments to both ofher children. This is supported by Williams's
aforementioned claim that moral residue can be used to determine whether a person is
an admirable moral agent or not.225
According to Williams' argument, Sophie's moral residue is evidence that she
is an admirable moral agent. If Sophie willingly chooses Eva over lan - and neither
hates herself for making such a choice, nor experiences negative emotions of self-
assessment or a "simple, but passionately motivated reticence,,226 to disclose her
choice - we would judge her to be callous and a morally questionable agent and
mother. That Sophie is pressurised into making the choice that she does, and is
wracked with guilt after her decision, is evidence that she is an admirable moral agent
committed to protecting both of her children from harm.
To the same extent, to argue that Agamemnon's commitments are incoherent
would entail the claim that all agents who make both public and private commitments
are incoherent, or that all leaders who commit themselves to protecting family
members are incoherent. It seems, however, that agents will necessarily commit
themselves to more than one type ofcommitment and to more than one principle, and
that - as Williams maintains - ifan agent is committed to certain principles and
values, she will experience conflicting values or commitments227. That such conflict is
inevitable in some sense is owing to the fact that an agent will commit herself to a
number ofdifferent values and principles in her life - principles that she adopts from
various social sources and to various people.
To argue that the likes of Agarnemnon or Sophie are incoherent would mean
that all agents with dual responsibilities to say, their family members or friends, and
their careers or civic duties, are incoherent. That would mean that all agents who
225 W'))'I lams, 1982, Page 173
226S
~ron,2000, Page 176
227 Williams, 1981, Page 72
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serve in the army, police force, government, or any career, could be deemed
incoherent in the event that they are committed to protect individuals close to them at
the same time that they are committed to their respective careers. Such a conception,
however, is both trivial and (like the conception that mothers should only have an
identity-conferring commitment to one child and not both) contrary to human
expenence.
Opponents, however, may argue that the fact that Sophie chooses Eva to be
gassed and that Agamemnon chooses to sacrifice Iphigenia is evidence that their
commitments can be ranked as the commitment they eventually act on must override
the other commitment. It remains, that the extracts I have cited, and the evidence of
Sophie and Agamemnon's moral residue, is sufficient to show that just as neither of
Sophie's commitments override each other, so neither of Agamemnon's commitments
override each other. This is because they both have identity-conferring commitments,
and because both of them have integrity. Thus, both Sophie and Agamemnon's
commitments are coherent, and, in the situations in which they both find themselves,
they would inevitably undermine their integrity and would thus inevitably do wrong.
It follows that both Sophie and Agamemnon's appropriate moral residue
satisfies the situation condition. As their moral residue is appropriate, their
commitments are thus both identity-conferring, and necessarily coherent. Given that
their commitments are coherent means that the rationally irresolvable conflict and the
inevitable loss of integrity that they face is not their own fault. ~ say that because their
commitments are coherent and yet they still face a rationally irresolvable conflict of
commitments.
That Sophie is unable to rationally resolve her conflict and choose between
lan and Eva without experiencing appropriate moral residue, coupled with the fact
that her commitments are coherent, proves that she is faced with a situation that meets
the third necessary condition ofa genuine moral dilemma: the situation condition.
That Agamemnon is unable to rationally resolve his conflict and choose between
sacrificing Iphigenia or Greece without experiencing appropriate moral residue,
coupled with the fact that his commitments are coherent, proves that he faces a
situation that satisfies the situation condition. That their appropriate moral residue is
evidence that their situations were imposed on them by the world, is based on the
claim that appropriate moral residue is moral residue experienced because the agent
undermined her integrity. However, for an agent to undermine her integrity it is
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necessary that she had integrity in the first place. Having integrity implies being
coherent. Thus, iftbe agent is coherent and has integrity then the situation in which
she finds herself is not her own fault and must therefore be a situation imposed on her
by the world.
Just as Sophie's appropriate moral residue is thus evidence that her choice is
"beyond" her "control,,,228 so Agamernnon falls in to an "unavoidable trap,"229 forced
on him by the Gods, that is likewise beyond his control. As he says, "Poor me - I
thanks to the gods I've got no way out of this situation!,,23o "I can't have what I want;
that's why I'm in! pain.,,23I They are both in situations that involve a degree of moral
luck and militating circumstances that necessitate loss and wrongdoing.
It follows that both Sophie and Agamemnon's moral residue, when
interpreted in terms of integrity, can be used to support the existence of genuine moral
dilemmas. By using the independent standard of integrity it is possible to escape the
objections while also supplying what their interpretations of appropriate moral residue
lack, and arrive at a way ofdetermining that moral residue is appropriate without
begging the question or assuming that the agent has done something for which she is
morally responsible. My interpretation ofappropriate moral residue supplies an
independent way of determining that an agent has done something wrong and that her
moral residue is appropriate without assuming that genuine moral conflicts or
dilemmas exist, and without assuming that agents like Sophie and Agamemnon can
only experience appropriate moral residue when they are morally blameworthy.
Thus, the moral residue argument supplemented with this accOlmt of
appropriate moral residue understood in terms of integrity can support the existence of
genuine moral dilemmas.
228 Stvroll, 2000, Page 604
229 -
Blondell, 1999, Page 344
23U Ib'dI . 1999, Page 347
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Conclusion
My discussion has shown how it is possible to save the moral residue argwnent. In so
doing, I outlined the conditions that a genuine moral dilemma would have to meet
were it to exist. I also discussed the debate between opponents and proponents of
genuine moral dilemmas. Were a genuine moral dilemma to exist it would have to
satisfy the conditions of a rationally irresolvable conflict of commitments, inevitable
loss, and a situation imposed on the agent by the world. I discussed proponents of the
existence of genuine moral dilemmas like Williams and Marcus, while outlining a
number of candidates that satisfy the sufficient conditions of a genuine moral
dilemma.
After discussing the debate concerning the existence of moral dilemmas I spelt
out the moral residue argument and the negative emotions of self-assessment involved
therein. McConnell, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Greenspan provide two compelling
objections to the efficacy of the moral residue argument, arguing that it is flawed on
two counts as it begs the question and fails to acknowledge that there are cases where
it is not inappropriate to experience moral residue even when the agent has done
nothing wrong. These objections, however, depend on specific conceptions of
appropriate moral residue that neither explain what the agent has done wrong, nor
provide an account of why the agent feels the harsh self-judgement ofguilt, shame, or
remorse that she does. In response to the flawed conceptions ofappropriate moral
residue assumed in the objections I proposed that the independent standard of
integrity would both overcome the objections and provide a more precise conception
of appropriate moral residue. That is, a conception of moral residue that can tell a
story about why the agent experiences negative emotions of self-assessment, and
explain what it is that makes the residue appropriate i.e what constitutes doing wrong
in cases ofdilemmas.
I based my analysis of integrity on McFall's conception of integrity. After
estaplishing the conditions of integrity and how a better conception ofappropriate
moral residue is one when the agent has compromised her integrity and thus done
something wrong, I showed how integrity can be used as an independent standard of
231 Blondei, 1999, Page 351
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proving that agents like Sophie and Agamemnon did something wrong. This I did by
showing that there is evidence in both Sophie 's Choice and Jphigenia at Aulis of both
Sophie and Agamemnon' s moral residue, and the fact that they would have
experienced moral residue regardless of how they had acted.
Both Sophie and Agamemnon's respective commitments satisfied the
conditions for integrity laid out in the third section. Consequently, in making their
respective choices they both violated an identity-conferring commitment, and thus,
undennined their integrity. Had either Sophie or Agamemnon acted on their other
commitment they would similarly have compromised their integrity and done
something wrong. It follows that they both would have undermined their integrity
and thus done something wrong no matter how they had acted. Given that both
Sophie and Agamemnon had coherent commitments, they were not responsible for the
inevitable wrongdoing of the choice that faced them. Thus, they both faced a
situation that satisfies the sufficient conditions of a genuine moral dilemma outlined
in the first section. In showing that Sophie and Agamenmon both experienced
appropriate moral residue and both would have done something wrong regardless of
how they acted, and by showing how their situations meet the criteria of an
irresolvable conflict of commitments, inevitable loss, and a situation imposed on them
by the world, I proved that genuine moral dilemmas exist and that the moral residue
argwnent can be salvaged and can support that fact.
The implications of my discussion are that much of moral theory as it stands
will have to be revised. The likes ofKant, Ross, and followers ofutilitarianism and
other rule-based ethical theories will have to revise their general conceptions that a
conflict of commitments is mtionally resolvable, and allow for the possibility that
genuine moral dilemmas exist and that not all conflicts are rationally resolvable by
appealing to some rule-based ethical theory or hierarchical system ofranking values
and conunitments.
That the moral residue argwnent can be salvaged points to the fact that moral
psychology can tell us much about whether a person is an adrrtimble moml agent or
not. It can also shed light on whether the agent has actually done something wrong or
not. My discussions similarly highlight the importance ofpersonal integrity in
making moral decisions and acting morally, and - again - in discerning whether an
agent actually has done something wrong that it is contrary to her personal
commitments.
91
It is important to look at moral dilemmas, moral residue, and integrity,
because of the further implications for moral theory and moral decisions. Given that
an agent's emotions of negative self-assessment can be used as evidence that she has
violated her integrity, it follows that moral residue and integrity are a central part of
an agent's moral decisions. Furthennore, the fact that moral dilemmas exist, and
violating integrity means that an agent has done something wrong, is evidence that all
morality is essentially a personal morality in the sense that an agent with integrity
makes a range of commitments, and it is essentially up to her to decide what she
commits herself to, and to ensure that she does not undermine or violate those
commitments. Although agents should ideally aim to reduce the conflict between
their personal commitments,m as shown - there are cases where that is not possible
and cannot necessarily be foreseen, means that much of moral theory as it stands
needs to be enhanced to account for the degree ofmoral luck involved in being moral
and making moral decisions. It thus seems that goodness is fragile, and that the
emotions of moral residue and the moral residue argument interpreted in tenns of the
independent standard of integrity, have a role to play in supporting the existence of
genuine moral dilemmas.
212 W~ll'--------
. 1 lams, 1981, Page 72
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